ANNEXES

Assessment of Climate Finance Channels for increase in Norwegian government support

Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment (ForUM)

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Final Report

24 November 2019

List of content:

Annex A - Terms of Reference for study

The Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment

5 June 2019

Evaluation of climate finance channels

Purpose of study

Assessment of financial channels for climate mitigation and adaptation.

Proposed method

Desk study of evaluation reports and other relevant documentation.

Time frame

The report should preferably be launched at the beginning of September 2019.

No later than the 16th of August, the author should provide a first draft of the report, which the reference group will comment. The author will take the comments into consideration when writing the final version.

Outsourcers and reference group

Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment

Norwegian Church Aid

Rainforest Foundation Norway

Friends of the Earth Norway

Caritas Norway

The Development Fund

Table of content

- Foreword (by the outsourcers) (1 page)

- Executive summary (2 pages)
- Part 1 (2 pages)
    - Introduction (including context of the global climate finance agenda)
    - Short methodology
- Part 2 (Aprox. 20 pages)
    - Introduction and assessments of each relevant channel (maximum 1 page per channel)
- Part 3 (Minimum 3 pages)
    - Recommendations based on the assessment (including suggestions for how the Norwegian government can fulfil their fair share).
- Part 4 (2 pages)
    - Conclusion

Introduction

In 2017, Norwegian CSOs launched the report *Counting What Counts - Analysis of Norwegian Climate Finance and International Climate Finance Reporting*. The report concluded that Norwegian climate finance had decreased by one third over the previous three years and that only 9 per cent on average had gone to adaptation over the preceding 7 years. In 2018, we launched a new report: *Norway's Fair Share of Meeting the Paris Agreement*. The authors at Stockholm Environment Institute estimated that Norway would have to contribute with international climate finance on a level around 65 billion NOK per year by 2030 in order to honor the Paris Agreement.

These reports have been important tools for Norwegian NGOs in our dialogue with decision makers. However, it is often argued that there are few suitable climate finance channels to absorb such large sums of funding, especially when it comes to adaptation. We now see the need to launch a third report that provides further information regarding the impact, effectiveness efficiency, suitability, and capacity of climate finance channels. This could offer advice for Norwegian decision makers on how to scale up Norwegian climate finance.

Evaluation criteria

A channel does not have to have a high score on all criteria. Different criteria could be applied depending on whether the fund is set up to address mitigation or adaptation, whether it is large or small, and so forth. The following is a non-exhaustive list of potential relevant criteria:

Impact

- Contribution to transformational change at societal level.
    - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees.
    - Contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.
    - Contribution to other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Effectiveness

- How effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are.
- In the case of adaptation projects: the extent of damage before and after new methods are implemented.
- Relevance of the portfolio at country level: the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries.

- Relevance of the portfolio at community and beneficiary level: the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the needs of beneficiariaries and local communities (such as sensitivity to needs of recipients/beneficiaries, their access to funds, their participation and ownership, and so forth).

Efficiency

- Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided.
- In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available.
- Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.

Sustainability

- Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)

Cross-cutting issues

- Environmental and social safeguards (including human rights, gender, minorities).
- Governance
    - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes.
    - Transparency and accountability
    - Anti-corruption practices (policies and compliance mechanism etc.).

Possible channels to assess (final list to be agreed with author)

- UNFCCC
    - GEF
        - SCCF
        - LDC fund
    - Green Climate Fund
    - Adaptation fund
- World Bank
    - Climate Investment Fund
    - International Finance Corporation (IFC)
    - Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP)
    - World Bank Climate Adaptation Program
    - Scaling Up Renewable Energy Programme (SREP)
- Regional initiatives
    - Multilateral development banks
    - African Renewable Energy Initiative
- UN Agencies
    - UNDP
    - UNEP
    - FAO
    - IFAD’s ASAP (Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme)
- Norwegian initiatives

- NICFI
- Norfund
- Norway’s renewable energy portfolio, including:
  - International Centre for Hydropower (ICH)
  - Energising Development (EnDev)
  - Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI)
- Bilateral support

The following background information regarding each channel should be provided

- Full name
- Governance-structure (owners/responsible)
- When it was established
- Purpose of fund (objective)
- Size of portfolio (historically, present and planned)
- Funds made available and pledged
- Ratio of funds applied relative to funds available (is there an unmet demand?)
- Main donors
- Disbursement time
- Management ability to handle large contributions
- Main recipients
- Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)
- Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique

If the author finds other relevant channels, evaluation criteria or background information, this should be added to the report. In the case that new channels and criteria will substitute those already mentioned in this ToR, this must be pre-cleared with the reference group (who will be obliged to respond quickly).

Annex B - List of persons contacted

Name	Organisation	Position
Governments:		
Bente Herstad	Norad	Policy Director. Section for Climate, Forest and Green Economy
Gard Lindseth	Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment	Senior Adviser
Hans Olav Ibrekk	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Hans Olav Ibrekk is Policy Director in the Energy Section. He
Henning Nøhr	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark	Chief consultant, Department for Evaluation of Development Assistance
Nils Boesen	The Danish Foreign Ministry	Currently consultant for The Danish Foreign Ministry. Former director UNDP
Poul Engberg-Pedersen	Former OECD	Former OECF, head of results and division, former Director General at Norad (2005-2009) and IUCN Deputy Director General
International NGOs and researches:		
Aron Halfen	Caritas Norway	Programme Advisor
Aled D Fisher	Friends of the Earth Norway	Advisor in Climate and communication
Fiona Percy	CARE International	Regional Coordinator, African Adaptation Learning Program at CARE International.
Hans Hessel-Andersen	UNEP	Senior Water Adviser at UN Environment
Håkon Grindheim	Norwegian Church Aid	Advisor in the policy and society department
Jan Thomas Odegard	The Development Fund	Director
Kristina Fröberg	The Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment (ForUM)	Senior Advisor
Lars Christiansen	UNEP-DTU partnership	Senior Project Officer and Senior Project Officer head of the Climate Resilient Development Programme at UNEP.
Michael P. Wells	Independent Environmental Consultant	Mikael Wells & associates
Obed Koringo	CARE	CARE's representative to the climate summit preparatory meeting
Torbjørn Gjefsen	Regnskogfondet	Senior Advisor in the policy department

Annex C - Literature list

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Annex E - Descriptions and assessments of the various finance channels

UN organisations

Green Climate Fund (GCF)

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Green Climate Fund (GCF)**
When the organisation was established	The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was set up by the 194 countries who are parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2010, as part of the Convention's financial mechanism. When the Paris Agreement was reached in 2015, the Green Climate Fund was given an important role in serving the agreement and supporting the goal of keeping climate change well below 2 degrees Celsius. The GCF is based in Incheon in South Korea and launched its initial resource mobilization in 2014.
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a new global fund created to support the efforts of developing countries to respond to the challenge of climate change. GCF helps developing countries limit or reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapt to climate change. It seeks to promote a paradigm shift to low-emission and climate-resilient development, taking into account the needs of nations that are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts. GCF aims to deliver equal amounts of funding to mitigation and adaptation, while being guided by the Convention's principles and provision.
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	The GCF have 24-members of the board. Where 12 are from developing countries and 12 from developed countries (seats for each UN regional group, SIDS and LDCs). This composition is perceived important by developing countries. The GCF is a legally independent institution with a fully independent secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary. The World Bank serves as the interim trustee of the GCF, and the Fund functions under the guidance of and remains accountable to the UNFCCC Conference of Parties. At the July 2019 Board meeting was again discussed a decision-making mechanism in the absence of consensus, as the Board has operated solely on the basis of consensus (which has delayed decision making considerable).

Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	Climate finance commitment: USD 146 mn. (2015), USD 1.087 mn. (2016), USD 1.156 mn. (2017). The Fund has per June 2019 committed USD 5.3 billion (or 75 %) of the USD 7.1 billion of available pledged capital. 1.156 billion committed in 2017. As explained in Chapter 4, GCF only contributed 2% of total climate finance during 2017. The second replenishment is a year and a half behind schedule. The operationalization of the fund has taken longer time. As explained in Chapter 4, GCF only contributed 2% of total climate finance during 2017.
Size of portfolio (historically)	GCF launched its initial resource mobilization in 2014, and rapidly gathered pledges worth USD 10.3 billion. 111 projects in 99 developing countries (GCF, 2019a). USD 5.2 billion has been committed in 2019, implementing 2.4 billion and with USD 10.3 billion pledged (GCF, 2019a). Only 1 out of 3 billion pledged from US was received under president Obama. President Triumph will not support GCF.
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	Top ten main donors by pledges: 1. USA, USD 3.000 mn. 2. Japan, USD 1.500 mn. 3. UK, USD 1.211 mn. 4. France, USD 1.035 mn. 5. Germany, USA 1.003 mn. 6. Sweden, USD 581 mn. 7. Italy, USD 334 mn. 8. Canada, USD 277 mn. 9. Norway USD 271 mn. 10. Australia, USD 187 mn. (GCF, 2019c). Two major contributors, Germany and Norway, announced their intention to double their contributions to the Fund ahead of COP 24. Norwegian government *"plan to increase Norway's contribution to the Fund from NOK 400 million to NOK 800 million a year from 2020"* (Norwegian Government, 2019). Norway hosting a replenishment meeting for the Fund in Oslo on 4-5 April 2019.
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	Co-financing and voluntary contributions through replenishments. The next replenishment will be held a Pledging Conference in October 2019.
Management ability to handle large contributions	The GCF Board has approved a number of Accredited Entities partner to implement projects. Guided by the Fund's investment framework and the priorities of developing country governments. They work alongside countries to come up with project ideas, and submit funding proposals for the GCF Board to approve Several of the bigger projects are implemented through multilateral development banks and UNDP. Per May 2018, 32 (54%) of GCF's accredited entities are direct access: 19 national and 10 regional. 19 of GCF's 76 approved projects are from direct access accredited entities, totaling USD 547 million. Per July 2019, GCF has around 224 staff members at its headquarters, in addition there are a number of consultants who support the staff. Some limited support is being provided offsite, in other countries. With close to a 50/50 balance between men and women, 63 nationalities, and many more languages spoken, the Fund is an institution that speaks and acts for all people on the planet. "*So far, it has maintained low administrative costs, but these could rise as the secretariat expands to manage more projects. On a per-project-approved basis, it has the highest administrative costs of any fund, over $1 million per project,*

	though this is likely to fall as the fund expands its project portfolio." (WRI, 2017)
Main recipients' countries	All developing country Parties to the Convention are eligible to receive resources from the GCF The GCF aims for "geographic balance", paying special attention to "particularly vulnerable" countries, including least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing states (SIDS), and African states. Less than 40 % of the support goes to LDC's, SIDS and African countries. (WRI, 2017) GCF and the Least Developed Countries' constituency organised the GCF Structured Dialogue with Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in November 2018.
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	At its inception, the GCF promised to dedicate half of its funds to adaptation, the other half going to mitigation. According to GCF website per August 2019: Mitigation 42%, Cross-cutting 34% and Adaptation 24%. A critical note from the Adaptation Watch (2017b): "*The money allocated by GCF for adaptation in LDCs is less than half a billion dollars. At this rate, it will take decades for the GCF to provide adaptation funding to all the LDCs. Given that the poorest communities in the LDCs are already facing the adverse, it would seem that putting their faith in getting funding from the GCF may not be worth the effort and that funding may not materialize in time for them to prevent the devastating effects of climate change*."
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	"The GCF is set to become the central fund for implementing the Paris Agreement; it will distribute the bulk of the USD 100 billion that industrialized countries aim to mobilize every year for climate mitigation and adaptation from 2020 onwards." (Adaptation Watch, 2017). "Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba, the Special Climate Change Representative of the UN Secretary General in regards to the forth-coming replenishment process culminating in Autumn 2019: "*The first consultation meeting took place on 4-5 April 2019 in Oslo, Norway, with a second consultation meeting to take place on 29-30 August 2019 Ottawa, Canada, and the pledging conference provisionally planned for Autumn 2019*" (GCF, 2019b). "Countries will also be supported in the pursuit of project-based and programmatic approaches in accordance with strategies and plans (such as low-emission development strategies, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, National Adaptation Plans of Action, National Adaptation Plans and others)." (Climate Funds Update, 2019).
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	"The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is the largest, most visible, and politically most significant of the multilateral climate funds." (WRI, 2018). "Despite positive progress, the Fund has yet to overcome several hurdles in realizing the promised paradigm shift." (Adaptation Watch, 2017). "The US federal withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, and announced stop of financing to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), highlights the need of other states to

	pay a fair share." (Danida, 2018). "While a collective duty for developed nations exists, there is no legal obligation for individual contributing countries on how much they should provide specifically to the GCF." (WRI, 2018). "Predictability of ambitious funding by the contributors is important to support developing countries' ability to strategize and plan their investments, including the implementation of their NDCs." (WRI, 2018). The World Bank' CIFs were established with a clause stating that they "will take necessary steps to conclude [their] operations once a new financial architecture is effective." (WRI, 2017). "In theory, the GCF could absorb some of the ongoing CIF portfolio of work, which would directly address the concern that the CIFs operate outside the guidance of the international community through the UNFCCC. The GCF has already accredited all the CIF implementing partners (MDBs), has started looking at programmatic approaches, supports country programming, and can provide the same spectrum of financial instruments and readiness support. If the CIFs do sunset, the GCF would need to ensure that it carries forward the CIFs' programmatic approach to financing." (WRI, 2017).
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	GCF funded projects for adaptation and mitigation purposes are highly relevant and globally recognized as instruments for sustainable development. But as the implementation phase of GCF's projects in LDCs and other countries is still on an early stage, few evaluation reports of GCF's overall effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability results exist. At its 21st meeting, the Board requested the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) to undertake a Forward-looking Performance Review (FPR) with a view to the GCF being a learning institution. The report published on June 30, 2019 came with the following recommendations: • New strategic plan that includes creating a climate finance knowledge hub, having a results-based approach in allocating resources, and leveraging the private sector as part of "scaled up and additional finance" • Better business model with a focus on disbursing through DAEs, including revising the accreditation framework and process • Reemphasize adaptation while recognizing the role of new actors/innovative Private Sector Finance • Reexamine supervision and management by delegating authority to the Secretariat for developing procedures, guidelines, and standards for Board-approved policies. (*see https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/evaluations/fpr*). *"In my experience the more mature funds (like LDCF/SCCF) will have resolved most of the infant illnesses and achieved a relatively pragmatic and workable procedure for preparing, approving and implementing projects. For the same reason, over time these funds will have developed a large portfolio of ready to implement projects that could be funded quickly if funding has materialized. E.g. LDCF has a large backlog of projects that cannot be funded due to lack of funds, while other funds like GCF have lots of funding and struggling to get volume on*

	eligible projects." (Survey 2019).

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	See "Climate Policies/Strategies in place", above. "The GCF finances activities to both enable and support adaptation, mitigation (including REDD+), technology development and transfer (including CCS), capacity-building and the preparation of national reports." (Climate Funds Update, 2019).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	No Evaluation reports have been produced on GCF performance yet, so it is difficult to assess impact. "As yet, only four LDCs have managed to accredit national entities with GCF." (Adaptation Watch, 2017). "Among the 25 adaptation projects approved so far, 12 projects, amounting to USD 357.6 million or 46% of the funds allocated for adaptation, went to LDCs." (Adaptation Watch, 2017) The GCF claim to have avaioded 1.5 b. tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GCF, 2019a).
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"The operationalization of the fund has taken longer than expected and the fund is only now beginning to channel funding to implementing organizations at a larger scale." (Danida, 2017). "More predictable funding is an important way to strengthen the fund's standing and improve its effectiveness." (WRI, 2018). "For the private sector to have confidence that the GCF is a significant and reliable partner, the fund needs predictable resources." (WRI, 2018).
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided.	"The GCF had 76 staff as of December 2016 (GCF 2016n). So far, it has maintained low administrative costs, but these could rise as the secretariat expands to manage more projects. On a per-project-approved basis, it has the highest administrative costs of any fund, over $1 million per project, though this is likely to fall as the fund expands its project portfolio." (WRI, 2017).

- In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	"Given the fund's large capitalization and broad mandate, the secretariat is already facing capacity constraints and the board set a target to fill 100 positions by the end of 2016, which is likely to be met in 2017 (GCF 2016n)." (WRI, 2017).
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	The GCF has extremely high ambitions regarding sustainability of interventions. Because the GCF was operationalized in 2016, it is difficult to assess sustainability of concrete outcomes, and whether GCF programmes and projects have long-term social, economic, environmental benefits is still to be unveiled and definitively proven.
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"GCF have the following safeguards policies in place: Fiduciary Standards and Interim Safeguards (applies the International Finance Corporation's, Performance Standards), Gender Policy and Action Plan and Mandate to develop an Indigenous Peoples policy". (WRI, 2017)
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	"The GCF supports strengthening NDAs and developing country programs as ways to help countries plan and set priorities for GCF resources" (WRI, 2017). "The secretariat is working with countries to explore how coordinated and inclusive engagement can be realized, and further work on the initial best practice guidelines may be needed. It is not yet clear whether these efforts have been effective, but the need for continued support in planning and coordination remains a critical issue within the GCF (GCF 2016l, Decision B.13/33)." (WRI, 2017) "To continue enhancing country ownership, the GCF should strengthen its readiness program and fund smaller interventions for national entities that need to build their capacities to handle larger amounts of funding." (WRI, 2017).
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"An initial [Evaluation] report [by the IEU] summarizing the key findings and emerging areas of recommendations is due by the end of March 2019. The final report will be completed by the end of June 2019 and used to inform the GCF's replenishment process." (Independent Evaluation Unit, 2019). Note that this report has not yet been published. "GCF's design builds on lessons from existing multilateral funds, including its results management and investment frameworks." (Dfid, n.d.).

Key information and conclusion

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was set up in 2010 by the 194 countries that are parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), intended to serve as the UNFCCC's financial mechanism. When the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015, the Green Climate Fund was given an important role.

Purpose: The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a global fund created to help developing countries limit or reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapt to climate change.

The GCF is the largest, most visible, and politically most significant of the international climate funds. It is headquartered in Incheon in South Korea and launched its initial resource mobilization in 2014.

The GCF has 24 members of its board. 12 are from developing countries and 12 from developed countries (seats for each UN regional group, SIDS and LDCs). This composition is perceived as important by developing countries.

As of June 2019, the GCF has committed USD 5.3 billion (or 75%) out of USD 7.1 billion in pledged and available capital. In the course of 2017, 1.156 billion was committed. As explained in Chapter 4, GCF only contributed 2% of total climate finance during 2017. The second replenishment is a year and a half behind schedule. The operationalization of the fund has taken longer than expected, as it took until last year to begin to approve significant levels of funding (re-granting). It is now due to be replenished in the boreal autumn of 2019, which will be important for the coming years.

The GCF aims to deliver equal amounts of funding for mitigation and adaptation. According to the GCF website, as of August 2019, spending on Mitigation is 42%, Cross-cutting 34% and Adaptation 24%. GCF's Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) cites the stark imbalance favouring mitigation over adaptation: "*Although there are efforts to increase the accommodation of adaptation projects, the reality holds that a large chunk of the Fund was approved to support mitigation projects*."

Less than 40% of the support goes to LDCs, SIDS and African countries, according to data from 2017 (WRI, 2017). At this rate, it will take several years for the GCF to provide adaptation funding to all the LDCs.

The implementation phase of GCF's projects is still at an early stage, and only few evaluation reports have been made. At its 21st meeting, the Board requested the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) to undertake a Forward-Looking Performance Review (FPR) with a view to the GCF being a learning institution. The report was published on June 30, 2019.

The GCF is one of the most promising funds in the global climate finance landscape. But at present, it lacks the capacity and decision-making for accelerating its approval of new projects. While LDCF has a large backlog of projects that cannot be financed due to lack of funds, the GCF has been struggling to spend its budget on eligible projects.

The GCF could focus on scaling up impact by providing larger-scale programme interventions. The Fund could explore programme approaches to adaptation, but leave smaller adaptation projects (e.g. less than $10 million) to the Adaptation Fund and coordinate with the LDCF to enhance efficiency in NAP funding and related implementation.

It is positive that a number of countries has announced their intention to double their contributions to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) at the pledging conference in Paris in October 2019. Norway will increase its contribution to the Fund from NOK 400 million to NOK 800 million a year from 2020.

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The Adaptation Fund (AF)

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Adaptation Fund**
When the organisation was established	The Adaptation Fund (AF) was officially launched in 2007, although it was established in 2001 at the 7th Conference of the Parties (COP7) to the UNFCCC in Marrakech. It was intended to finance climate adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
Purpose of fund (objective)	The fund is designed to finance climate change adaptation projects and programs based on the priorities of eligible developing countries.
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	At the COP23 in Bonn in 2017 UNFCCC it was decided that the Adaptation Fund "shall serve the Paris Agreement" from January 2019. It was also decided, that the fund should continue to receive the share of proceeds, if available from some of the activities under the Kyoto Protocol. The Adaptation Fund is supervised and managed by the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) that is composed of 16 members and 16 alternates and meets at least twice a year. The Board has "*a minimum of 62.5% (and a maximum of 69%) of Board members are from developing countries*". "The AFB is unique in that the majority of representatives are from developing countries." (evaluation from TANGO international, 2018). In the governing board there are 16 members, 2 from each of the 5 UN regional groups 1 SIDS, 1 LDC, 2 Annex I Parties and 2 non–Annex I Parties (developing countries have approx. 69% of seats on the board). The function of AF is still being negotiated, the latest was at SB50 in Bonn in June 2019, where it was discussed which article of the PA, which should regulate the AF. The international NGO Network CAN International was pushing for more resourced or the fund, since the fund depends on a thin support in order to pursue its thin mandate. "*The Fund has a zero-tolerance policy on fraud and corruption for its Board, which was adopted in October 2014*." (Grimm et al., 2018). "While (…) the gender balance of the AF Board has slightly improved over time, there remains a considerable gap that needs to be addressed" (Grimm et al., 2018). Furthermore, the following was mentioned in the survey: "The AF offers slightly better representation in the board, but decisions are in fact often less transparent (or at least equally non-transparent) than GEF sec and council decisions." (Survey 2019) A strong feature is the transparency in AF. Stakeholders is provided with the opportunity to read and comment on project proposals before they are presented

	to the Board for consideration. As an example, for the 34th AF Board meeting, the AF Secretariat has published 33 project proposals and concepts for comment and review. The NGO Germanwatch is very active in promoting participation of the internationally NGO community and is also making their written assessments of each Board meeting. Information on the process and the official project proposals can be found here: https://www.adaptation-fund.org/projects-programmes/proposals-concepts-under-review/
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	Climate finance commitments for 2016 (outflows): 32 million US $ Climate finance commitments for 2017 (outflows): 104 million US $. (from table in Chapter 4).
Size of portfolio	"Thirty-three of 63 projects in the portfolio are either in an African country, LDC and or SIDS (20 projects are in African countries, 16 projects are in LDCs and 11 projects are in SIDS" (TANGO international, 2018). "Since its establishment and through March 2017, the Adaptation Fund approved $416 million for climate adaptation initiatives in 63 projects in 53 countries." (TANGO international, 2018).
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	"As of January 2018, Germany had contributed the largest amount at just over $288 million, nine countries [Sweden ($98,5), Spain ($57,1), Belgium ($19,94), Italy ($16,3), UK ($15,9), Switzerland ($14,2), Finland ($6,9), France ($5,6) respectively] have contributed over $522 million, and CER proceeds accounted for just under $200 million." (TANGO international, 2018). Norway's contributions; First grant in August 2010: 90,000 US $ and second last) grant given in December 2013: 2,440,000 US $, Norway's grand Total: 2,530,000. Last time Norway supported AF was December 2013 (Norad, 2019) with 15,0 millioner NOK disbursement. Source: Norwegian-aid-statistics: https://norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/access-to-microdata/ Funding pledges confirmed during COP19 were led by Germany's € 30 mio., and include: Austria, € 0.5 mio.; Belgium & the Brussels Capital, Flanders and Wallonia Regions, € 3.25 mio.; Finland, € 5M; France € 5 mio.; Norway, KR 15 mio.; and Switzerland, CHF 10 mio. (AF, 2019)
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	"Funding for the Adaptation Fund comes from two main sources: proceeds from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and voluntary contributions, both of which fluctuate over time" (TANGO international, 2018). AF was originally financed with a share of proceeds from the clean development mechanism (CDM) project activities. The share of proceeds amounts to 2 % of certified emission reductions (CERs) issued for a CDM project activity.
Overall approval and disbursement time	"The Adaptation Fund's project cycle management is efficient, but increasingly tested by the expanding portfolio and new standards. Project approvals have taken longer, particularly those for two-step projects in FY 2016, which exceeded

	31 months; in contrast, the approval time for one-step projects dropped dramatically from over 21 months in FY 2016 to just seven months in FY 2017 (Table 2)" (TANGO international, 2018).
Management ability to handle large contributions	The World Bank serves as trustee of the Adaptation Fund on an interim basis. Total contributions have so far been 859 Mio. US $. (World Bank, 2019). "The AF Secretariat of 10 full-time staff is housed in and uses the GEF Secretariat for some administrative matters. It has the highest administrative budget as a proportion of fund size, at 5.6 percent of its cumulative capitalization. However, this is partly due to its funding smaller projects; on a per-project-approved basis, administrative costs are mid-range relative to other funds, at under $600,000." (WRI, 2017) The Adaptation Fund have struggled to ensure enough funding. At the same time, it is a fund, that have a high support from the international community. An example of this was during COP19, where the AF received strong financial support from seven European governments. At COP19 the Adaptation Fund Board did welcome the backing, which came at a crucial time for the Fund, and ensured that it could continue helping people around the world adapt and build resilience to climate change. (AF, 2019) "*I am very pleased to see that our plea for support has resulted in significant commitments,"* said Hans Olav Ibrekk (Norway), chair of the Board. "*This will partly address the pipeline issue and bring short-term relief. The challenge in the mid-to longer term will be to ensure sustainable and predictable support to the Fund.*" (AF website)
Main recipients	"To be eligible for the AF, developing countries must be Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and be vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, including low-lying and other small island countries, countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems, arid and semi arid areas, and areas susceptible to floods, droughts, and desertification." (WRI, 2017) Approximately almost 100% of the support goes LDCs, but also SIDS and African Countries (WRI, 2017).
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	100 percent adaptation. (TANGO international, 2018).
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	"According to stakeholders, the AF adds value as the only fund dedicated to adaptation because countries are able to prioritize and finance adaptation without any pressure to decide over the trade-offs of adaptation versus mitigation." (TANGO international, 2018). "Stakeholders recognized the AF's specialized focus in financing concrete action as a strength." (TANGO international, 2018). "The WRI report highlighted that the AF has advantages such as speedy delivery of concrete activities as it can establish clear and specialized processes for concrete projects without having to invest time in planning and coordination activities at national level like other funds." (TANGO international, 2018) "In terms of project-approval efficiency, the Adaptation Fund has a clear

	advantage over other climate funds. The Adaptation Fund averaged 8.1 months to approve one-step projects and 12.6 months for two-step projects; however, this figure is rising (see WRI report data presented in Table 3). This is much faster than the LDCF and SSCF, which implement projects of similar scale and take an average 19 month to approve projects." (TANGO international, 2018)." "The AF Board "defines the AF's mission as being to "serve the Paris Agreement by accelerating and enhancing the quality of adaptation action in developing countries"." (Grimm et al., 2018).
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	"The fund specifically adds value to the global climate finance architecture in three aspects; exclusive focus on adaptation, supporting concrete activities and direct access implementation." (TANGO international, 2018), the report is commissioned by the World Bank. "The Adaptation Fund is efficient in managing accreditation and project cycle processes. Even as the volume of accreditation applications and project proposals increases, the Adaptation Fund Board Secretariat maintains its efficiency." (TANGO international, 2018). However, AF also have it's challenges. "Like the LDCF and SCCF, the AF also faces resource challenges, although to a lesser extent at present." (WRI, 2017). "The AF was designed to operate primarily on revenues from a 2 percent levy on sales of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits under the Kyoto Protocol, which had been expected to raise significant resources. However, the collapse of the CDM market has meant that resources have fallen well short of ambition, and the fund currently relies on contributions from governments to operate, with nearly \$300 million out of the \$500 million it has received in cumulative receipts coming from government contributions (…). The low capitalization (…) has limited their ability to fund their project pipelines and make long-term plans." (WRI, 2017). "If the AF is to continue with its work long-term it will likely need to raise its \$10 million country cap to allow for continued and sustained investment where appropriate." (WRI, 2017). "The cost per approved project is also higher for the Adaptation Fund, particularly compared to the GEF, LDCF and SCCF, because those funds have larger project portfolios and thus achieve economy of scale in project administration" (TANGO international, 2018) There is room for improvement on the funds ability to learn from projects, it is being recommended that, the AF "Consolidate project experiences and lessons across the portfolio and establish feedback loops to better apply lessons in project relevant processes." (TANGO international, 2018). "In particular, the IET recommends exploring the convening of an expert panel to suggest specific criteria for selecting regions, countries and social groups; and to assist the AFB in the region and country selection process. It is not satisfactory to speak only in terms of "vulnerable communities" since climate hazards do not equally affect all people within a community, or even the same household. Indeed, the inequitable distribution of rights, resources, and power constrains

	many people's ability to take action on climate change, especially women." (TANGO international, 2015). Furthermore, the following weakness of AF was mentioned in a survey: "Micromanagement in projects - making adaptive management difficult. Many administrative procedures during implementation (with limited/no added value). Generally, it is difficult for me to see what niche AF is filling between SCCF and GCF both of which seem to have almost identical mandates to AF." (Survey, 2018) The future of AF is still a bit unclear: "The AF could continue to support equitable allocation and country ownership by focusing on small- scale adaptation activities and increasing countries' direct access to funding. (…) the AF plays an important role in building the capacities and track record of national institutions to undertake adaptation work, and can be a stepping-stone for many national institutions to access the GCF." (WRI, 2017) "In principle, it would be possible for the GCF to absorb functions performed by the AF, but a dedicated fund for adaptation could still provide added value. (…) However, many stakeholders noted that with its experience in small-scale adaptation and direct access, the AF could still play a distinct role in the architecture. If so, there should be a division of labor between the funds for adaptation, where the AF builds on its niche, while the GCF focuses on larger, more transformative, or financially innovative approaches. If the AF continues, one option would be to develop formal institutional linkages between the GCF and the AF. The GCF could channel funds to the AF as programmatic envelopes to seed small-scale activities that could be taken back to the GCF for further funding and scaling up at a later stage. This would address resourcing constraints for the AF and would likely require lifting its current country cap so that countries with greater need could receive more than $10 million. Another possible solution to the AF's resource challenge would be to decide that a share of proceeds from the mitigation and sustainable development mechanism, established under the Paris Agreement, should be channeled through the AF." (WRI, 2017)
Comments from Survey	"*To me the actual capacity developed (and sustained) from projects is highly variable and depending on a large number of factors, many of whom depends on motivations and actions of local partners in the countries and the implementing/executing institutions involved and less so on the specific fund originating the funding*." (About Adaptation Fund in the team's Survey, 2019) "*LDCF/SCCF and AF proposals are generally very clearly based in existing national adaptation plans/priorities. However, needs to be said that these are often quite broad and easy to align with*." (Survey, 2019) "To a very large extent the prioritization of how and where funds are used is left to national stakeholders in all three funds, and as such the degree to which particularly poor communities, indigenous people etc. is prioritized varies from country to country. All funds have policies in this regard, but if you enforce them

	strictly, you loose national ownership (and vice versa, if you do not it becomes up to countries if and how to prioritize such issues)" (Survey, 2019)

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"Within the evolving climate finance architecture, the Adaptation Fund remains relevant due to its unique characteristics and services." (TANGO international, 2018).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	"The Adaptation Fund has been able to increase developing countries' access to adaptation finance." (TANGO international, 2018). "While countries appreciate that the Adaptation Fund dedicates funding for concrete action, the scale of available financing limits the extent to which adaptation costs are met." (TANGO international, 2018).
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"Overall, Adaptation Fund projects are delivering results as planned, though there is room for improvement" (TANGO international, 2018) "The quality of awareness programmes conducted in the projects were satisfactory. Positive aspects of the awareness raising programmes included the involvement of appropriate stakeholders and participatory methods that increased the outreach and sustenance of key messages." (TANGO international, 2018).
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation	"The Adaptation Fund is found to be cost-efficient in its operations although costs are rising due to its expanding portfolio and activities." (TANGO international, 2018). "The Adaptation Fund incurs higher transaction costs than other funds, primarily

to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	due to its smaller size" (TANGO international, 2018). "The cost per approved project is also higher for the Adaptation Fund, particularly compared to the GEF, LDCF and SCCF, because those funds have larger project portfolios and thus achieve economy of scale in project administration" (TANGO international, 2018). "Cost efficiency of projects were difficult to assess as cost effectiveness are not systematically assessed in project proposals." (TANGO international, 2018)
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"The Adaptation Fund is formally associated with SDG 13 on climate action, and its portfolio is relevant to other SDGs." (TANGO international, 2018).
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"The Adaptation Fund portfolio shows positive steps in mainstreaming gender although this is not achieved systematically across the portfolio" (TANGO international, 2018). "The AF's Environmental and Social Policy (…) is considered to be aligned with relevant international best practices." (Grimm et al., 2018).
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	"Almost all projects received a satisfactory or better rating for project relevance, indicating close alignment of the project design to stakeholder needs, climate change adaptation strategies, the National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) and national development plans." (TANGO international, 2018). "The Adaptation Fund projects demonstrate relevance to NDCs" (TANGO international, 2018). "The AF does not specifically support planning or coordination as it is focused on supporting NIEs and funding small concrete projects. However, the process of selecting NIEs and direct access projects (supported through readiness) has, in some cases, spurred coordination at the national level." (WRI, 2017) "LDCF/SCCF and AF proposals are generally very clearly based in existing national adaptation plans/priorities. However, needs to be said that these are often quite broad and easy to align with." (Survey, 2019)
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"…the Adaptation Fund's medium-term strategy (…) fosters learning and sharing in adaptation and complementarity between climate funds." (The Green Climate Fund, 2019) There is room for improvement of consolidating "project experiences and lessons across the portfolio and establish feedback loops to better apply lessons in project

	relevant processes." (TANGO international, 2018).

Key information and conclusion

The Adaptation Fund (AF) was officially launched in 2007, although it was established in 2001 at the 7th Conference of the Parties (COP7) to the UNFCCC in Marrakech. The Fund was established under the Kyoto Protocol but at COP23 in Bonn in 2017 it was decided that the Adaptation Fund "shall serve the Paris Agreement" from January 2019.

Purpose: The fund is designed to finance climate change adaptation projects and programs based on the priorities of eligible developing countries.

AF is supervised and managed by the Adaptation Fund Board with 16 members, 2 from each of the 5 UN regional groups 1 SIDS, 1 LDC, 2 Annex I Parties and 2 non–Annex I Parties. In this way, developing countries have 69% of seats on the board.

AF is strong on transparency. Stakeholders is provided with the opportunity to read and comment on project proposals before they are presented to the Board for consideration. As an example, for the 34th AF Board meeting, the AF Secretariat has published 33 project proposals and concepts for comment and review. The NGO Germanwatch is very active in promoting participation of the internationally NGO community and is also making their written assessments of each Board meeting.

Climate finance commitments for 2016 (outflows): 32 million US $ and for 2017: 104 million US $. Since its establishment and through March 2017, the Adaptation Fund approved $416 million for climate adaptation initiatives in 63 projects in 53 countries.

An external evaluations give a general positive impression of AF, which commissioned by the World Bank was carried out by ANGO International in 2018. The strength of the fund is, that it has a unique focus on vulnerable countries and developing countries, despite of this mandate. However, a main issues for AF is the thin support of funding, implying higher transaction costs due to its smaller size.

It is suggested that Norway consider readmitting its contributions to Adaptation Fund (which ended in 2013), and affiliate with the fund in collaboration with like-minded donors as Sweden and Germany. AF have good experience supporting adaptation projects, which Norway does *not* focus enough on. Furthermore, the AF supports the LDC's and vulnerable countries, and is underfunding for addressing these needs.

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The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) managed by the GEF

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Least Developed Countries' Fund**
When the organisation was established	1992 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established in relation to the first Rio Conference in 1992, with a mandate to preserve global environmental benefits, and it serves as finance mechanisms for the Rio Conventions, e.g. climate change, biodiversity and desertification.
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) was established in 2001 under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is operated by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The *purpose* of LDCF is to address the special needs of the Least Developed Countries under the UNFCCC (currently 47 countries). As part of its mandate, the LDCF helps countries prepare and implement National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs). NAPAs are country-driven strategies that identify the most immediate needs of LDCs to adapt to climate change. Target sectors include water; agriculture and food security; health; disaster risk management and prevention; infrastructure; and fragile ecosystems. The LDCF focuses on reducing the vulnerability of key sectors identified through the NAPA process, financing on-the-ground adaptation activities that provide concrete results in support of vulnerable communities. The thematic focus of the fund is adaptation. (WRI, 2017) LDCs are defined as low-income countries that are highly vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks and have low levels of human assets. There are currently 47 countries (as per 2018) on the list of LDCs which is reviewed every three years by UN's Economic and Social Council. (UNCP, 2018)
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption	The GEF is the managing body of the LDCF funds. As such, the GEF's operational policies, procedures and governance structure are applied to the fund. The LDCF Council is the main governing body of the LDCF. The Council is comprised of 32 members who represent GEF member countries, 14 from donor constituencies and 18 from recipient constituencies. "For each tracked GEF Council and LDCF/SCCF Council decision, self-ratings are provided by GEF Management on the level of adoption with an explanatory commentary." (MOPAN, 2019). "Some decision-making transparency concerns were raised in one LDCF

practices	evaluation.” (MOPAN, 2019).
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	Climate finance commitments for 2016 (outflows): 70 million US $ Climate finance commitments for 2017 (outflows): 145 million US $
Size of portfolio (historically, present and planned)	By 2018, the LDC Fund had approved around US$1.37 billion for the funding of projects and programs, leveraging almost US$6.7 billion in co-financing from partners. As of 2018, the Fund supported 297 projects and programs in 46 of the least developed countries, the largest portfolio of adaptation projects of its kind. (IEO, 2018b). The Fund has enabled 47 (before 49) of the world’s most poor countries to access resources.
Main donors (including Norway’s contribution)	Germany (334.7 million US $), United Kingdom (186.8 million US $), Sweden (122.5 million US $), Belgium (115.2 million US $), Netherlands (75.3 million US $) and Denmark (63,4 million US $) (cumulative since 2003) (CFU, 2019). Norway have since 2003 pledged 32.2 million US $ in total to the fund. In 2013, Norway pledged $3.7 million for LDCF (and $2.5 million for SCCF). Norway’s contributions; First grant in August 2010: 90,000 US $ and second last) grant given in December 2013: 2,440,000 US $, Norway’s grand Total: 2,530,000. Last time Norway supported LDCF was 20,0 million NOK disbursement in 2013. Norway also disbursed 20 million in 2012. Source: Norwegian-aid-statistics: https://norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/access-to-microdata/ The Danish prime minister accounted in his COP21 speech a commitment to the LCD Fund of 22 million USD [156 million DKK].
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	LDCF depends on voluntary contribution. The governing Council of the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund (LDCF/SCCF) works for new pledges from donor countries.
Overall approval and disbursement time	”While financial disbursements are tracked, no explicit disbursement targets at the corporate level exist.” (MOPAN, 2019).
Management ability to handle large contributions	“Since its establishment, the LDCF has provided support totalling $1.3 billion for 260 projects, programs and enabling activities to meet the special needs of LDCs to adapt to the impacts of climate change. As of May 2018, 2018, 47 countries are eligible to access resources from the LDCF. As of the same date, 36 LDCs had accessed $20 million or more in LDCF support.” (GEF, 2018). Pledged 1.4 billion US $, Approval of 1.2 billion US $ (cumulative since 2003).

	(CFU, 2019) "In my experience the more mature funds (like LDCF/SCCF) will have resolved most of the infant illnesses and achieved a relatively pragmatic and workable procedure for preparing, approving and implementing projects. For the same reason, over time these funds will have developed a large portfolio of ready to implement projects that could be funded quickly if funding has materialized. E.g. LDCF has a large backlog of projects that cannot be funded due to lack of funds, while other funds like GCF have lots of funding and struggling to get volume on eligible projects." (Survey, 2019)
Main recipients' countries	All 47 LDC countries. See further information at Climate Update' website. The support goes primarily to LDCs and African Countries, but also SIDS. (WRI, 2017)
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	Adaptation only (WRI, 2017)
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA)	The Objectives for 2018-2022 are; "*Reduce vulnerability and increase resilience through innovation and technology transfer for climate change adaptation, (…) Mainstream Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience for Systemic Impact (…) Foster Enabling Conditions for Effective and Integrated Climate Change Adaptation.*" (GEF, 2018). The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) (…) designated as part of the operating entity of the financial mechanism for the Paris Agreement (GEF, 2018). "LDCF/SCCF funding has supported activities that, for the most part, are highly relevant to UNFCCC decisions". (IEO, 2018b)
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	One of the strengths of LDCF is the clear focus on "the world's poorest and most vulnerable countries" access to resources for the preparation of their NAPAs. (GEF, 2016). According to an IEO evaluation of LDCF the LDCF-supported activities have also been there "is a generally high degree of coherence between the scope of LDCF-funded activities and both the guidance and priorities of the UNFCCC and the GEF, and the development priorities of countries receiving LDCF support." (IEO, 2016) Furthermore "There is a clear intent to mainstream adaptation into countries' environmental and sustainable development policies, plans, and associated processes." (IEO, 2016) Despite the continued relevance of the funds, the LDCF "has been negatively affected by the unpredictability of available resources. Despite employing

measures to expedite the project cycle, the LDCF's efficiency has experienced negative effects from the unpredictable nature of avail- able resources. There is no formal resource mobilization process, and the Fund has to rely on voluntary contributions." (IEO, 2016)

Furthermore "The Independent Evaluation Office's comprehensive OPS evaluations have been particularly valuable, but there is scope to improve lesson learning from successful and unsuccessful practice and to strengthen knowledge management more generally. " (MOPAN, 2019).

The following conclusion can be found in "*MOPAN 2017-18 Assessment of GEF*" in relation to the USD 4 billion pledged for GEF-7 for supporting more than 140 developing countries to meet their obligations to five multilateral environmental agreements.

"This MOPAN assessment concludes that overall, GEF is a relevant, capably managed and effective facility. Its strategies, plans and programmes are rigorously

discussed and reviewed every four years based on comprehensive evaluations. These evaluations have concluded that GEF is achieving its mandate and objectives and continues to play a unique role as a financial mechanism for multilateral environmental agreements. They also concluded that GEF has a strong track record in delivering relevant results, even if sustainability and efficiency remain areas of weaker performance. GEF has strong operational management processes and financial controls that benefit from the underlying World Bank infrastructure.

MOPAN is concerned that "much of GEF's rich knowledge is fragmented, difficult to access and underutilised."

Unfortunately, the 121 pages MOPAN report has almost no specific information about the "LDC Fund". It is focussing on GEF' general management and administration.

"The SCCF, and to a lesser extent the LDCF, have struggled to attract funding to support their intended operations. (…) If countries agree that the respective niches of the two funds, as identified in the discussion on specialization above, are important to maintain, one option would be for one or both of these funds to be absorbed by the GEF. The LDCF and SCCF work programs would then be able to access the main GEF Trust Fund pool of resources (donor countries would reallocate funding previously earmarked for the LDCF and SCCF to be part of their GEF replenishments). The GEF already operates both funds, and the GEF Council serves as the LDCF/SCCF Council, so day-to-day operations might not be significantly different. In addition, since GEF-5, the GEF has begun funding multiple trust fund projects in conjunction with the LDCF or the SCCF (GEF-IEO 2014). The GEF could reopen an adaptation window, building on past experience with the Strategic Priority on Adaptation (which ran from 2004 to 2010), but focus it on LDCs.

The COP/CMA would need to give guidance to initiate ramping down both

	funds, and the LDCF/ SCCF Council, in conjunction with the GEF Council, would need to decide to dissolve the LDCF and SCCF and have their portfolios transferred into the GEF. It would also be important to ensure that the GEF's mandate to fund projects that provide global environmental benefits does not impede its ability to fund locally rooted adaptation. Alternatively, countries could close the SCCF and cede its work to the GCF, CIFs, and GEF. This could either be done actively, with a decision of the COP and the LDCF/ SCCF Council, or passively, since the fund is already not approving new projects due to lack of funding, and absent new contributions, it would, de facto, become dormant. The LDCF also faces resource constraints, but it has a clearer niche in supporting equitable allocation; other funds are not as targeted in supporting adaptation in LDCs. If additional contributions come in, the LDCF could continue and, in coordination with the GCF, support the development and implementation of NAPs in LDCs. It is possible that eventually the GCF could take over the LDCF's role or that, a decade from now, there is less need for a separate dedicated fund." (WRI, 2017) "The LDCF could support equitable allocation by positioning itself to be complementary to the AF in the small-scale adaptation space, focusing particularly on projects larger than \$10 million or on least developed countries (LDCs) that do not gain direct access to the AF. The LDCF currently plays an important role in providing more options for LDCs to access adaptation funding. To date, the LDCF has supported development and implementation of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs), which are short-term plans, in nearly all LDCs. It is now supporting the development and implementation of national adaptation plans (NAPs), which are long-term plans to build resilience and critical for capacity building. The emphasis on national planning also supports country ownership." " (WRI, 2017) " The LDCF and SCCF have been funded on an ad hoc basis by developed country contributors, leading to unpredictable resource levels. (…) The other two windows of the SCCF have also faced funding challenges. In the past two years, the fund has received less than \$3.5 million in new pledges, and due to insufficient funds, no projects were brought to the its council for approval during 2016 (GEF 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016c). " (WRI, 2017)
Comments from Survey	"LDCF/SCCF and AF proposals are generally very clearly based in existing national adaptation plans/priorities. However, needs to be said that these are often quite broad and easy to align with. This also imply that the degree to which particularly poor communities, indigenous people etc. is prioritized varies from country to country. All funds have policies in this regard, but if you enforce them strictly, you loose national ownership" (Survey, 2019) "To me the actual capacity developed (and sustained) from projects is highly variable and depending on a large number of factors, many of whom depends on motivations and actions of local partners in the countries and the

	implementing/executing institutions involved and less so on the specific fund originating the funding." (Survey, 2019)

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"LDCF: It is the only fund entirely dedicated to support adaptation action in LDCs thereby reaching the people most vulnerable to climate change." (Danida, 2018). A challenge is "increased competition from other finance mechanisms including the Green Climate Fund (GCF)" (Danida, 2018).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	"Each of the LDCs have received support for adaptation measures reducing the vulnerability of more than 20 million people to the adverse impacts of climate change" (Danida, 2018). "LDCF activities have strengthened institutional capacities and integrated adaptation into policies and plans at several levels." (GEF/LDCF.SCCF, 2015).
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"Available data suggest that a high percentage of GEF-supported projects have achieved satisfactory environmental outcomes. Outcomes in large countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and the Russian Federation) and in landlocked countries were better on average than those in LDCs and in SIDSs." (MOPAN, 2019). "The results on outcome ratings for this year's cohort of projects [2017] are lower than the outcome ratings for projects reviewed as part of the AER 2016 and AER 2015." (IEO, 2018a). "About 70 percent of projects [completed in 2017] had outcome ratings in the satisfactory range, and the remaining six projects were all rated moderately unsatisfactory." (IEO, 2018a).
d. Efficiency	"Financial sustainability remains a critical concern. The efficiency of the LDCF

- Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	has been reduced due to unstable governments, unpredictability of resources, climate extremes and natural disasters, co-funding requirements, and lengthy project approval processes." (MOPAN, 2019). "The efficiency of the LDCF has been negatively affected by the unpredict-ability of available resources." (GEF/LDCF.SCCF, 2015).
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"In terms of the sustainability of outcomes, roughly 60 percent of completed projects [19 completed projects in 2017] received ratings in the likely range." (IEO, 2018a). "A lack of robust planning for sustainability, uncertainty regarding future funding, and the absence of support programs or formalized structures for the maintenance of infrastructure developed as part of the pilots, are all factors that might negatively impact the likelihood of sustainability." (IEO, 2018a). "A lack of ownership, a lack of supporting policy changes, political uncertainty, and—again—a lack of funding beyond the project's timeline, are all factors linked to sustainability ratings in the unlikely range." (IEO, 2018a).
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"On July 1st, 2018, the GEF Policy on Gender Equality, which is also applicable to LDCF activities, came into effect. The GEF IEO regards it as substantial progress on the adoption of the gender mainstreaming related recommendation" (IEO, 2019)..
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	"The LDCF supports the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) and the National Adaptation Plan (NAP)" (Danida, 2018). "LDCF support for the NAPAs also provides some evidence of development of an enabling environment." (MOPAN, 2019). "Through the LDCF, the GEF has enabled 51 of the world's poorest and most vulnerable countries to access resources for the preparation of their NAPAs." (GEF, 2016). "In the context of planning, the LDCF plays an important role in supporting adaptation planning in LDCs. It supports both the development of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs, which are short-term plans) and national adaptation plans (NAPs, which are longer-term plans) in LDCs." (WRI, 2017)

h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	”There is a clear commitment to results-based management (RBM) in GEF, and the RBM system has played a strong role in accountability and reporting. (…) The Independent Evaluation Office’s comprehensive OPS evaluations have been particularly valuable, but there is scope to improve lesson learning from successful and unsuccessful practice and to strengthen knowledge management more generally. ” (MOPAN, 2019).

Key information and conclusion

The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) is one of the funds under the GEF that was born after the Rio Summit in 1992. LDCF was established in 2001 under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is operated by the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

The *purpose* of the LDCF is to address the special needs of Least Developed Countries under the UNFCCC (currently 47 countries).

As part of its mandate, the LDCF helps countries prepare and implement National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs). NAPAs are country-driven strategies that identify the most immediate needs of LDCs to adapt to climate change. By 2017, the Fund had financed the formulation of NAPAs in 51 LDCs to help countries identify urgent and immediate adaptation needs.

The LDCF has strong legitimacy among developing countries, whose representatives are in the majority in the LDCF Council composed of 32 members who represent GEF member countries, 14 from donor constituencies and 18 from recipient constituencies.

The LDCF holds one of the largest portfolios of adaptation projects in LDCs. By 2018, the LDCF had approved around USD 1.37 billion for the funding of projects and programmes, leveraging almost USD 6.7 billion in co-financing from partners. LDCF's climate finance commitments for 2017 (outflows) were USD 145 million.

The activities of LDCF have strengthened the institutional capacity and integrated adaptation into policies and plans at several levels. Despite the Fund being highly regards, it is constrained by having an unpredictable budget, as it relies on voluntary contributions. Additionally, there is, according to external evaluations, room for improvement regarding the institution’s learning from its own practices. Thus far, the Fund has provided access of resources to 47 of the world’s poorest countries. Today, the demand for support of LDCs has increased due to a number of factors, including urgent threats posed by the growing impacts of climate change.

The assessment of the LDCF is mainly based on “MOPAN 2017-18 Assessment of Global Environment Facility (GEF)” from 2019.

Based on the evaluation in view of the assessment criteria, it is suggested that Norway consider resuming its contributions to the LDCF (which were suspended in 2013) in order to meet the growing global needs for adaptation finance. Another argument for supporting the LDCF is that like-minded countries (such as Germany, Sweden, and Denmark) are already doing so.

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The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) managed by the GEF

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)**
When the organisation was established	The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) was established in response to guidance from the Conference of the Parties (COP6) and confirmed (COP7) in Marrakech in 2001.
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	The thematic focus of the fund are adaptation and technology transfer. (WRI, 2017) Purpose quoted from the COP6 decision: "That a special climate change fund shall be established to finance activities, programmes and measures related to climate change that are complementary to those funded by the resources allocated to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) climate change focal area and by bilateral and multilateral funding, in the following areas: (a) Adaptation (b) Technology transfer (c) Energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management, and (d) Activities to assist developing country Parties [i.e. economies dependent on income from fossil fuels] in diversifying their economies." "*Adaptation is the top priority. But the SCCF also funds, through separate financing windows, technology transfer, mitigation in selected sectors including: energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management; and economic diversification.*" (The GEF website 2019)
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	The GEF acts as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and was entrusted with the administration and financial operation of the SCCF. The overall responsibility lies with the GEF Council and also exists the LDCF/SCCF Council (which is separate from the GEF Trust Fund). It has 16 member, 8 from developed countries and 8 from developing countries (implying high legitimacy for developing countries). Furthermore, there are observers from 4 civil society organizations (CSOs), 2 Indigenous Peoples and 2 private sector representatives. "For each tracked GEF Council and LDCF/SCCF Council decision, self-ratings are provided by GEF Management on the level of adoption with an explanatory commentary. Ratings and commentary on tracked decisions are also provided by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) for verification." (MOPAN, 2019).

	In the governing body there are 32-members of the council; 16 developing countries, 14 developed countries and 2 economies in transition. (WRI, 2017)
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	Climate finance commitments for 2016 (outflows): 1 million US $ Climate finance commitments for 2017 (outflows): 2 million US $
Size of portfolio (historically)	"As of 2017, the SCCF has a portfolio of nearly US$350 million in voluntary contributions supporting 77 projects in 79 countries." (The GEF website, 2019) "The UNDP has the largest financial share of the SCCF portfolio with $91.4 million and 31.1 percent of the total number of projects. The World Bank has the second largest share of the portfolio with $86.81 million and 18.9 percent of total number of projects." (IEO, 2017). "A large percentage of the SCCF portfolio is implemented through UN Agencies, that together account for 62.2 percent of SCCF projects and 58.6 percent of SCCF funding ($195.56 million)" (IEO, 2017).
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	Norway have contributed with (34,6 mio. US $) cumulative since 2003. (Climate Finance Update, 2019). In 2013 Norway disbursed 15,0 mio. NOK to SCCF. (Norad, 2019) The other main donors are: Germany (120.5 mio. US $), Denmark (9 mio. US $), United Kingdom (18.6 mio. US $) and Finland (18.3 mio. US $), contributions are all cumulative since 2003. (Climate Finance Update, 2019). "Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) generate larger amounts of co-financing ($1.4 billion), as opposed to UN Agencies ($1.05 billion). The World Bank's SCCF projects leverage the largest amount, at 29.2 percent of all co-financing, followed by UNDP with 25.2 percent respectively" (IEO, 2017).
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	SCCF only receives voluntary contributions with no regular replenishment schedule (and *not* from the general support to GEF, where the GEF Trust Fund is replenished every four years)
Overall approval and disbursement time	Pledged 371 million US $, Approval of 285 million US $ (cumulative since 2003). (CFU, 2019). GEF's seventh replenishment period, or GEF-7, covers 2018-22. While the USD 4 billion pledged is slightly lower than that for GEF-6, this latest replenishment confirms the important role GEF plays in supporting more than 140 developing countries to meet their obligations to five multilateral environmental agreements. "While financial disbursements are tracked, no explicit disbursement targets at the corporate level exist." (MOPAN, 2019).
Management ability to handle large contributions	"The majority of SCCF projects are under implementation – 43 projects, accounting for $193.5 million or 58 percent of the CEO endorsed portfolio." (IEO, 2017). "Forty-three projects of the entire portfolio of 117 projects have been

	cancelled, dropped or rejected." (IEO, 2017). The SCCF works with the same 18 agencies as the GEF, including the original three GEF Implementing Agencies (UNDP, UNEP and World Bank). In this way, SCCF takes advantage of challenging their funds through well-established international organizations. "GEF is the world's largest public funder of projects and programmes that aim to benefit the global environment. The GEF Trust Fund is the primary source for grants made by GEF. This is replenished every four years through contributions from donor countries. GEF also administers two smaller trust funds. As of June 2018, GEF has provided a total of USD 17.9 billion since 1992 through these trust funds." (MOPAN, 2019) "the more mature funds (like LDCF/SCCF) will have resolved most of the infant illnesses and achieved a relatively pragmatic and workable procedure for preparing, approving and implementing projects. For the same reason, over time these funds will have developed a large portfolio of ready to implement projects that could be funded quickly if funding has materialized. E.g. LDCF has a large backlog of projects that cannot be funded due to lack of funds, while other funds like GCF have lots of funding and struggling to get volume on eligible projects." (Survey, 2019)
Main recipients countries	"open to all vulnerable developing countries" (The GEF, 2019) Most of the SIDS country group, but also LDC's and African countries. (WRI, 2017) The SCCF is the only adaptation fund open to all vulnerable developing countries. Not surprisingly, the demand for resources far outstrips what's available. Each year, the GEF receives about US$250 million in requests for adaptation support. (SCCF website)
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	Both mitigation and adaptation. (WRI, 2017) "the SCCF targets key sectors for adaptation and technology transfer. (…) The GEF supports the transfer of climate-resilient technology for both mitigation and adaptation." (The GEF, 2019)
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	During COP21, to give effect to the Paris Agreement, "Par. 58. Decides that the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility, the entities entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, as well as the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, administered by the Global Environment Facility, shall serve the Agreement;" (IEO, 2017).
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	According to the IEO 2017 evaluation, "SCCF is one of only a limited number of multilateral funds providing funding for innovative adaptation projects ….. The SCCF has focused more on highly innovative approaches in new and emerging adaptation areas, aiming to provide a basis for upscaling by other financing mechanisms … For example, the Adaptation Fund's niche has been community-based adaptation, while the Green Climate Fund has taken previously financed concepts to scale, in order to achieve transformational

	impact." Nevertheless, it is a major constraint for SCCF to depend on voluntary contributions and not the periodically replenishment for GEF. "Despite the continued relevance of the Fund, its popularity amongst non-Annex I countries, and evidence that tangible adaptation results are being delivered, the SCCF's resources have been completely inadequate to meet demand, with contributions to the Fund effectively stalled since 2014." (IEO, 2017). "This is obviously affecting the SCCF's short-term performance, but there is a significant risk that longer-term performance is also being undermined: as a direct consequence of the limited and unpredictable resources, some GEF Agencies have confirmed that they are no longer considering or promoting the SCCF when discussing proposal developments with project partners." (IEO, 2017). The time, financial cost and political capital required to develop and build support for proposals could not be justified against the high risk of no funding being available. The SCCF ressource situation can be characterized as a vicious circle: no resources are available, so no proposals are developed, which can be interpreted by donors as limited interest or lack of demand, so donors do not provide resources." (IEO, 2017). "As SCCF has struggled to attract funding to support their intended operations, some has suggested to close it down. WRI is suggesting that SCCF can be taken over by GCF and through core GEF support (Future of the Funds: Exploring the Architecture of Multilateral Climate Finance." (WRI, 2017) "The SCCF, and to a lesser extent the LDCF, have struggled to attract funding to support their intended operations. (…) If countries agree that the respective niches of the two funds, as identified in the discussion on specialization above, are important to maintain, one option would be for one or both of these funds to be absorbed by the GEF. The LDCF and SCCF work programs would then be able to access the main GEF Trust Fund pool of resources (donor countries would reallocate funding previously earmarked for the LDCF and SCCF to be part of their GEF replenishments). The GEF already operates both funds, and the GEF Council serves as the LDCF/SCCF Council, so day-to-day operations might not be significantly different. In addition, since GEF-5, the GEF has begun funding multiple trust fund projects in conjunction with the LDCF or the SCCF (GEF-IEO 2014). The GEF could reopen an adaptation window, building on past experience with the Strategic Priority on Adaptation (which ran from 2004 to 2010), but focus it on LDCs. The COP/CMA would need to give guidance to initiate ramping down both funds, and the LDCF/ SCCF Council, in conjunction with the GEF Council, would need to decide to dissolve the LDCF and SCCF and have their portfolios transferred into the GEF. It would also be important to ensure that the GEF's mandate to fund projects

	that provide global environmental benefits does not impede its ability to fund locally rooted adaptation. Alternatively, countries could close the SCCF and cede its work to the GCF, CIFs, and GEF. This could either be done actively, with a decision of the COP and the LDCF/ SCCF Council, or passively, since the fund is already not approving new projects due to lack of funding, and absent new contributions, it would, de facto, become dormant." (WRI, 2017) The following conclusion can be found in "MOPAN 2017-18 Assessment of GEF" in relation to the USD 4 billion pledged for GEF-7 for supporting more than 140 developing countries to meet their obligations to five multilateral environmental agreements. "This MOPAN assessment concludes that overall, GEF is a relevant, capably managed and effective facility. Its strategies, plans and programmes are rigorously discussed and reviewed every four years based on comprehensive evaluations. These evaluations have concluded that GEF is achieving its mandate and objectives and continues to play a unique role as a financial mechanism for multilateral environmental agreements. They also concluded that GEF has a strong track record in delivering relevant results, even if sustainability and efficiency remain areas of weaker performance. GEF has strong operational management processes and financial controls that benefit from the underlying World Bank infrastructure. MOPAN is concerned that "much of GEF's rich knowledge is fragmented, difficult to access and underutilised." Unfortunately, the 121 pages MOPAN report has almost no specific information about the "Special Climate Change Fund". It is focussing on GEF' general management and administration. "The SCCF could support equitable thematic allocation by focusing solely on its technology window and cede its work on adaptation to the AF and GCF. The SCCF's technology transfer window has to date received less attention and financing; however, it is the only fund with an explicit thematic window for technology transfer. While the SCCF's adaptation window is currently larger, there are now four other funds that support adaptation, with several billion dollars in combined resources. This suggests the SCCF's thematic niche, if adequately resourced, could be in technology." (WRI, 2017) "The SCCF and, to a lesser extent, the LDCF, have struggled to attract funding to support their intended operations and may need to close or be consolidated. If there are no additional pledges, one option would be for both of these funds to be absorbed by the GEF so that relevant activities can continue through core GEF support. Another option is to close the SCCF (since the GCF, CIFs, and GEF can support similar activities) but maintain the current operations of the LDCF, assuming adequate resourcing. While the GCF does emphasize adaptation support for small island developing states (SIDS), LDCs, and African countries, it is not targeted as closely as the LDCF is for LDCs. If no formal decision is taken to sunset the SCCF, it is likely to become functionally

	dormant, due to lack of contributions." (WRI, 2017)
Comments from Survey	"LDCF/SCCF and AF proposals are generally very clearly based in existing national adaptation plans/priorities. However, needs to be said that these are often quite broad and easy to align with." (Survey, 2019) "To me the actual capacity developed (and sustained) from projects is highly variable and depending on a large number of factors, many of whom depends on motivations and actions of local partners in the countries and the implementing/executing institutions involved and less so on the specific fund originating the funding." (Survey, 2019)

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"The relevance of SCCF support to other, non-adaptation GEF focal areas – and to GEF's global environmental benefits – is limited" (IEO, 2017). "The GEF Secretariat should articulate and publicly communicate the SCCF's niche within the global adaptation finance landscape, to include an explicit statement regarding the SCCF's relation with – and complementarity to – the Green Climate Fund" (IEO, 2017).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	"The SCCF's niche within the global adaptation finance arena has been its accessibility for non-Annex I countries, and its support for innovative adaptation projects" (IEO, 2017).
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"The SCCF portfolio is highly likely to deliver tangible adaptation benefits and catalytic effects" (IEO, 2017).

d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	"The SCCF's effectiveness and efficiency has been seriously undermined by limited and unpredictable resources." (IEO, 2017).
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"The ultimate catalytic effect of scaling-up often demands further investments" (IEO, 2017).
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"The gender sensitivity of the SCCF portfolio has strengthened over time, with this improvement almost certainly influenced by the GEF's Policy on Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Equality Action Plan." (IEO, 2017).
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	"SCCF support has been highly relevant to UNFCCC guidance, to GEF adaptation strategic objectives, and to countries' national environmental and sustainable development goals and agendas" (IEO, 2017).
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"A portfolio analysis protocol, including a quality-at-entry review, was developed using a survey tool to systematically assess the projects, so as to ensure that key project-level questions [of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, results and sustainability] were addressed consistently and coherently" (IEO, 2017) " There is a clear commitment to results-based management (RBM) in GEF, and

	the RBM system has played a strong role in accountability and reporting. (…) The Independent Evaluation Office's comprehensive OPS evaluations have been particularly valuable, but there is scope to improve lesson learning from successful and unsuccessful practice and to strengthen knowledge management more generally. " (MOPAN, 2019).

Key information and conclusion

SCCF was established in 2001 to finance activities, programmes and measures related to climate change that are complementary to those funded by the resources allocated to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) climate change focal area.

The *objective* of the SCCF is to support adaptation and technology transfer in vulnerable developing countries. Quoted from the SCCF website about adaptation and technology transfer:

Adaptation: Funds adaptation related to water resources management, land management, agriculture, health, infrastructure development, fragile ecosystems and integrated coastal zone management. It also supports early warning systems and builds capacity for disaster prevention related to climate change.

Technology transfer: Supports the transfer of climate-resilient technology for both mitigation and adaptation. This goes hand-in-hand with support to help countries put the technology to use and apply research, as well as to implement demonstration projects. Has also funded regional Climate Technology Centers and Networks.

The overall responsibility lies with the GEF Council, though there is also an LDCF/SCCF Council. It has 16 members, 8 from developed countries and 8 from developing countries, i.e. a relatively high representation of developing countries.

The SCCF is recognised for its thematic focus: Adaptation and Technology transfer, where developing countries clearly need international support. The SCCF often supports innovative approaches in new and emerging adaptation areas, aiming to provide a basis for upscaling by means of other financing mechanisms (e.g. the Green Climate Fund). Additionally, the LDCF has a relatively flexible and workable procedure for preparing, approving and implementing projects.

As of 2017, the SCCF has a portfolio of nearly USD 350 million in voluntary contributions supporting 77 projects in 79 countries. Its climate finance commitments for 2017 (outflows): USD 2 million. Accordingly, the SCCF's effectiveness and efficiency have been undermined by limited and unpredictable funding (IEO, 2017). It is a major constraint for SCCF to depend on voluntary contributions rather than the periodical replenishment of the GEF. This raises the question of whether there is a viable future for the SCCF.

Norway should consider supporting the SCCF due to considerable demands for technology transfer and adaptation. (See below about the Climate Technology Centre and Network CTCN).

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UN-REDD Programme

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	UN-REDD Programme United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
When the organisation was established	UN-REDD Programme was launched in 2008 and builds on the convening role and technical expertise of FAO, UNDP and UNEP.
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	The UN-REDD Programme supports nationally led REDD+ processes and promotes the informed and meaningful involvement of all stakeholders, including indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities, in national and international REDD+ implementation. The UN-REDD Programme strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of developing countries to reduce forest-related emissions. The aim of REDD+ is to encourage developing countries to contribute to climate change mitigation efforts by: i) reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by slowing, halting and reversing forest loss and degradation; and ii) increasing removal of GHGs from the earth's atmosphere through the conservation, management and expansion of forests. Countries interested in REDD+ are required to progress through three phases: Readiness phase, implementation of national strategies and results-based demonstration activities and results-based demonstration activities.
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	The UNDP has been appointed as the Administrative Agent for the UN-REDD Programme Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)". "Of the 19 seats of the Policy Board of the UN-REDD Programme, Indigenous Peoples (IPs) are represented by the Chair of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) – on a non-rotational basis – and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) also hold one seat" (Climate Funds Update, 2019).
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	UN-REDD outflows in million USD: 34 million (2014), 49 million (2015), 33 million (2016) and 19 million (2017). See chapter 4. Contributions from Donors (Annex 1) was 14,4 million USD in 2018.

Size of portfolio (historically)	Accumulated contributions from donors to the UN-REDD was US$ 308 millions at the end of 2018 (UN-REDD website).
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	A number of donors contributed to the Programme during its 2008-2015 phase, with the Government of Norway providing a significant portion of the funds. Other donors included the governments of the European Commission, Denmark, Japan, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland (UN REDD, 2019). Norway pledge 29 million USD to UN REDD work plan 2018-2020 (UN REDD, 2017).
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	The UN-REDD Programme depends entirely on voluntary funds. (UN REDD, 2019).
Management ability to handle large contributions	UN-REDD administrated 16,19 million USD according to the account for 2018. The UN-REDD utilizes the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund, where funds received from donors are pooled and implementation is the responsibility of the three participating UN organizations.
Main recipients' countries	Developing countries "The UN REDD Programme has partnerships with 42 countries in total, 16 of which have received funding allocations for National Programmes. " (Climate Funds Update, 2019).
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	Mitigation only
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	The UN REDD Programme Strategic Framework 2016-2020 states that "The overall development goal of the Programme is: to reduce forest emissions and enhance carbon stocks in forests while contributing to national sustainable development." (UN REDD, 2017).
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	"In essence, instead of building on the capacities and motivation of in-country stakeholders to ensure the maintenance of forest resource systems, the performance-based architecture of REDD+ has made progress dependent on the continuation of technical and financial support coming from abroad" (Frechette et al., 2014). "The UN-REDD Programme is a relevant response to UNFCCC negotiations and the emerging REDD+ agenda, but uncertainty over the future of REDD+ financing and slower-than-expected progress on most aspects of the proposed mechanism are creating new challenges" (Frechette et al., 2014) An external team made in 2014 an evaluation of the UN-REDD

	Programme. *"The UN-REDD Programme has helped draw global and national attention to the importance of forests. It has given previously marginalized populations a strong voice in relevant decision-making arenas; it is leading countries to engage in policy reforms, increase transparency and reduce the risk of corruption; it has triggered the search for viable solutions to the problems associated with deforestation; it is supporting the valuation of forests and the services they provide; and it has allowed a broad range of stakeholders to gain experience with an innovative construct that now makes it possible to better articulate the conditions for sustainability and how such an agenda should be pursued."*
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"The evaluation rated the strategic relevance of the Programme as satisfactory" (Frechette et al., 2014). "Valued for its integrated approach to sustainable resource use, the UN-REDD Programme is largely consistent with country needs and priorities" (Frechette et al., 2014).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	"Though countries differ considerably in terms of their initial capacity and ability to achieve stated objectives, all face considerable challenges, and none of the reviewed countries have so far achieved satisfactory ratings in all outcome areas" (Frechette et al., 2014).
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which	"The evaluation rated the delivery of outputs as moderately satisfactory and programme effectiveness as moderately unsatisfactory" (Frechette et al., 2014). "Overall, the UN-REDD Programme is effective in terms of producing key outputs, and progress towards outcomes is improving" (Frechette et al., 2014).

intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	"The distribution of resources across the Programme is not linked to a clearly articulated strategy" (Frechette et al., 2014).
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"Achieving and sustaining outcome-level results is an ongoing challenge" (Frechette et al., 2014).
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"The Programme's emphasis on safeguards and the need for the free, prior and informed consent of forest-dependent populations has created more sustained support amongst civil society and Indigenous Peoples' organisations" (Frechette et al., 2014).
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	"UN-REDD enjoys strong buy-in from host ministries downward (environment or forestry departments), but country ownership remains weak overall, with limited involvement from policy- makers, non-forest-related ministries, and the private sector" (Frechette et al., 2014).
h. Learning	"The UN-REDD Programme relies on monitoring and evaluation tools of

Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	its implementing agencies" (Climate Funds Update, 2019).

Key information and conclusion

UN-REDD Programme was launched in 2008 and builds on the convening role and technical expertise of FAO, UNDP and UNEP.

Purpose: The UN-REDD Programme supports nationally led REDD+ processes and promotes the informed and meaningful involvement of all stakeholders, including indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities, in national and international REDD+ implementation.

Of the 19 seats of the Policy Board of the UN-REDD Programme, Indigenous Peoples (IPs) are represented by the Chair of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) – on a non-rotational basis – and civil society organisations (CSOs) also hold one seat. The UNDP has been appointed as the Administrative Agent for the UN-REDD Programme Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

The main recipients of UN REDD funds are developing countries for mitigation purposes. The programme intends to strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of developing countries to reduce forest-related emissions.

Contributions from donors was USD 14.4 million in 2018. Norway is providing a significant portion of the funds (USD 29 million to the UN REDD work plan 2018-2020). Other donors include the European Commission, Denmark, Japan, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland (UN REDD, 2019).

The UN-REDD Programme depends entirely on voluntary contributions, and uncertainty over the future of REDD+ financing is a challenge.

The report "External Evaluation of the UN REDD Programme" from 2014 concluded that the programme is playing a significant role in global forest governance. The programme enjoys strong buy-in from host ministries (e.g. environment or forestry departments), indigenous peoples' and civil society organisations.

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Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) within IFAD

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP)**, which is a programme initiated in 2012 under International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).
When the organisation was established	IFAD was established in 1977 as a specialised agency of the United Nations, which was a response to UN's 1974 World Food Conference. The first phase of ASAP was from 2012 to 2017 - labelled a flagship programme administrated by IFAD. The Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) is IFAD's flagship programme for channeling climate and environmental finance to smallholder farmers. The programme is incorporated into IFAD's regular investment processes and benefits from rigorous quality control and supervision systems. (MOPAN, 2019)
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	Objectives of ASAP: To channel climate and environmental finance to smallholder farmers, scale up climate change adaptation in rural development programmes and mainstream climate adaptation into IFAD's work. ASAP funds activities that focus on: • **policy engagement** –supporting agricultural institutions in IFAD Member States seeking to achieve international climate change commitments and national adaptation priorities; • **climate risk assessment** – facilitating the systematic use of climate risk information when planning investments to increase resilience; • **women's empowerment** – increasing the participation of women in, and their benefits from, climate-change adaptation activities; • **private-sector engagement** – strengthening the participation of the private sector and farmer groups in climate change adaptation and mitigation activities; • **climate services** – enhancing the use of climate information for when planning investments to increase resilience; • **natural resource management and governance** – strengthening the participation and ownership of smallholder farmers in decision-making processes; and improving technologies for the governance and management of climate-sensitive natural resources; • **knowledge management** – enhancing the documentation and dissemination of knowledge on approaches to climate-resilient agriculture. The goal is "to invest in rural people to enable them to overcome poverty and achieve food security through remunerative, sustainable and resilient livelihoods". (MOPAN, 2019)

Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	”IFAD’s highest decision-making body is the Governing Council, which meets annually and is open to all of the Fund’s 176 member states. Member states are grouped into three lists that broadly categorise them as countries that provide contributions to the Fund but do not receive IFAD support (List A); countries that are members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, provide contributions and may receive IFAD support (List B); and developing country recipients, many of whom also provide contributions (List C). The Executive Board is composed of representatives from 18 member states (plus 18 alternates) drawn from 8 List A countries, 4 List B countries and 6 List C countries.” (MOPAN, 2019). IFAD works in partnership with Recipient Country Governments, national extension services, a range of national and international research institutes, civil society organisations, as well as communities and Farmers‘ Organisations (FOs), including women‘s groups.
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	The overall target for the ASAP2 Trust Fund is US$100 million (according to their website). ASAP2 (phase 2) is financed by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), which has agreed to contribute NOK 80 million – equivalent to about US $9.5 million – to the ASAP Trust Fund. Furthermore, SIDA has provided SEK 60million – equivalent to US $5.9 million. In the big picture, the annual climate finance commitments for IFAD were 416 million US $ in 2016 and 523 million US $ in 2017.(see chapter 4).
Size of portfolio (historically)	During the first phase of ASAP, from 2012 to 2017, IFAD programmed US$305 million in ASAP grants in 41 countries, expecting to reach more than 5 million vulnerable smallholders to cope with the impacts of climate change and build more resilient livelihoods. ASAP has enhanced climate risk mainstreaming in IFAD’s investment processes, and promoted innovative tools and technologies that smallholders are using to protect their assets from greater climate variability. As of 31 December 2017, IFAD was financing 211 ongoing projects in 97 countries. Based on its project-level experience, IFAD also works towards its results by building and disseminating knowledge, including through policy engagement. (MOPAN, 2019) For the three most recent years with available data, IFAD’s annual loan and grant disbursements were USD 660.5 million (2015), USD 702.6 million (2016) and USD 804.6 million (2017). (MOPAN, 2019)
Main donors (including Norway’s contribution)	Norway is a significant donor to ASAP 2(phase 2) with NOK 80 million – equivalent to about US $9.5 million – to the ASAP Trust Fund. Other key donor is SIDA with SEK 60million – equivalent to US $5.9 million. Other donors are also supporting IFAD: Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and United Kingdom. Norway has supported IFAD replenishments with: IFAD 9: 2013 - 2015: 90 million NOK IFAD 10: 2016 - 2018: 105 million NOK Norwegian-aid-statistics: https://norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/access-to-microdata/ This is a quote from ASAP website:

	"The Contribution Agreements of both Nordic nations follows from their strong support during the first phase of ASAP. The renewed commitments will go toward addressing the additional costs of climate change in IFAD's investment programmes, and contribute to specific elements of the Sustainable Development Goals, as set out in the results framework of the agreements. IFAD values the confidence that Norway and Sweden have shown in the Fund's ability to carry out operations on behalf of smallholder farmers."
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	ASAP programme is financed by voluntary contributions from donors, and not recourses from replenishment IFAD 10 2016 - 2018. "IFAD's core resources are provided by member state contributions, with these contributions mobilised through the Fund's replenishment process. Undertaken every three years, the replenishment consultation is a process, usually lasting one year, whereby the Governing Council reviews IFAD performance, sets strategic direction, and invites new commitments and contributions." (MOPAN, 2019) "Member state contributions remain static, but the Fund's programme of loans and grants continues to expand, so IFAD is working to diversify its funding base beyond member state core contributions." (MOPAN, 2019)
Overall approval and disbursement time	"Speed of disbursement remains to be improved: Both independent evaluations and management reporting consistently identify disbursement delays as having potentially negative effects on IFAD's results. Recent improvements have, however, been noted." (MOPAN, 2019)
Management ability to handle large contributions	IFAD is handling significant disbursements every year (from 660 million in 2015 to USD 804 million in 2017).
Main recipients' countries	"The recent IFAD 11 replenishment consultation process set targets that will see 90% of core resources allocated to lower- and lower middle-income countries (with the remaining 10% targeted for allocation to upper middle-income countries). Geographical allocation targets were also set, with 50% of core resources allocated to Africa (45% to sub- Saharan Africa). A further target will see 25-30% of resources allocated to work in the most fragile situations." (MOPAN, 2019)
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	In the Survey, we asked which finance channels are able to ensure adaptation in Least Developing Countries, there was one responded who commented that; "ASAP and FAO are good but have limited project-based funds". (Survey 2019)
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	IFAD's current "ten-year Strategic Framework" (2016-25) establishes three strategic objectives: increase poor rural people's productive capacities, increase poor rural people's benefits from market participation and strengthen the environmental sustainability and climate resilience of poor rural people's economic activities. (MOPAN, 2019)

Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	The following findings are primarily based on MOPAN "2017-18 ASSESSMENTS International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)" from 2019. "The assessment identified (…) key strengths of IFAD: 1. A clear mandate supported by a well-articulated strategic framework that is aligned with the 2030. As the 2013 MOPAN assessment noted, IFAD's strategic framework is tightly linked to its mandate and provides an admirable level of detail on the Fund's direction and approach. 2. Regular, intensive consultation processes that ensure a responsive, relevant organisation. The replenishment consultation process, the Farmers' Forum, the Indigenous Peoples' Forum, and the intensive country strategy development and project design processes all help to ensure that IFAD's work is relevant to the needs and priorities of member states. The strength of these processes is likely a factor in the highly relevant results that IFAD delivers for partner countries. It also drives agility to respond to demands. 3. A transparent, well-defined approach to resource allocation. IFAD's Performance-Based Allocation System continues to ensure that resource allocation strongly corresponds to the Fund's immediate strategic priorities. Addition- ally, IFAD is devoting considerable effort to ensuring that its services can continue to be delivered to as many member states as possible, including upper-middle-income countries. 4. A strong institutional focus on results that is underpinned by a well-developed results infrastructure. (…) The strong results focus extends to the Fund's evaluation function, which continues to be robust." (MOPAN, 2019) "IFAD's work is relevant to the needs and priorities of member states." (MOPAN, 2019) Besides IFADs advantages, the following areas for improvement, was also identified: "The assessment also identified five major areas for improvement: 1. Speed of disbursement remains to be improved: Both independent evaluations and management reporting consistently identify disbursement delays as having potentially negative effects on IFAD's results. Recent improvements have, however, been noted. 2. Institutional capacity analysis should be strengthened: While capacity analysis is undertaken during strategy and project development and delivery, it is comparatively basic. This constrains IFAD's capacity for higher-level policy engagement and limits cross-cutting results in governance – beyond the absence of dedicated policy. 3. Shortcomings in targeting strategies weaken IFAD's approach. Targeting approaches sometimes lack clarity regarding the specific intended beneficiary groups, with potential implications on the relevance of interventions and on reaching the most vulnerable. This has also implications on cross-cutting results in human rights – also beyond the absence of dedicated policy and explicit guidelines. (…) 4. Measurement of knowledge work needs to be enhanced: IFAD's rapidly expanding focus on the deployment of its own knowledge

	assets should be supported by a more rigorous approach to monitoring and evaluation of the Fund's knowledge role, outputs and influence. 5. Integration of performance data and lesson learning could be more systematic: IFAD corporate reporting recognises this shortcoming. Several well-developed processes and feedback loops are in place for integrating past experience into new intervention designs, but these processes are not applied systematically." (MOPAN, 2019) "Sustainability remains one of IFAD's weakest areas, but notable examples of interventions being mainstreamed into government activity are evidence of a positive trend in sustainability of benefits." (MOPAN, 2019)"
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"The replenishment consultation process, the Farmers' Forum, the Indigenous Peoples' Forum, and the intensive country strategy development and project design processes all help to ensure that IFAD's work is relevant to the needs and priorities of member states. The strength of these processes is likely a factor in the highly relevant results that IFAD delivers for partner countries. It also drives agility to respond to demands." (MOPAN, 2019)
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	"Accordingly, the Fund places considerable emphasis on routinely measuring the criterion of "rural poverty impact". The last three ARRIs (2015-17) confirmed that performance on rural poverty impact has been consistently strong. The criterion is further measured at a more granular level through the four sub-domains of household income and assets, human and social capital and empowerment, food security, and institutions and policies." (MOPAN, 2019) "IFAD's performance and contribution to results in the domain of environment and natural resource management have been weak in comparison to other results areas. (…)The adaptation criterion was scored lowest, although the ARRI noted that because the adaptation criterion was new, immature monitoring methodologies and limited evidence may have contributed to the poor score." (MOPAN, 2019)
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of	"IFAD's achievement against its expected results has been reasonable, with some poorer performing areas. (…) IFAD's achievement against its expected results has been reasonable, with some poorer performing areas." (MOPAN, 2019) "IFAD consistently delivers positive contributions towards rural poverty reduction, particularly in the domain of human and social capital; however, results in the domain of food security are less strong. (…) IFAD is delivering positive results on gender equality and the empowerment of women, but it needs to focus more on targeting and achieving systemic changes. (…) IFAD's main channel for strengthening governance is

local communities.	through the empowerment of poor people, and particularly through the development of stronger grassroots institutions, but higher-level policy engagement- related results are limited." (MOPAN, 2019)
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	"IFAD's systematic, well-defined approach, including recently adopted targets for distributing its resources to the poorest member states, ensures that resource allocation is transparent and continuously aligned to strategic priorities. (…) While IFAD has a robust resource allocation system in place, meeting disbursement targets continues to be a difficulty. (…) IFAD's financial transparency and accountability are supported by a solid audit function, although the Fund's policy on preventing fraud and corruption is dated. (…) IFAD has established the foundations for results-based budgeting, but tracking and reporting of costs from activity through to result is still not sufficient. " (MOPAN, 2019)
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"Sustainability remains one of IFAD's weakest areas, but notable examples of interventions being mainstreamed into government activity are evidence of a positive trend in sustainability of benefits." (MOPAN, 2019) "IFAD's work on innovation and scaling-up is performing strongly. The sustainability-related criterion of innovation and scaling-up assesses the extent to which IFAD has introduced innovative poverty reduction approaches and the extent to which governments, donors and other institutions have scaled-up IFAD interventions. " (MOPAN, 2019)
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"The ENRM Evaluation Synthesis confirms that IFAD has made steps at the corporate level to improve IFAD's commitment to ENRM issues. This included establishment of an Environment and Climate Division (now the Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion Division), environmental and social safeguards being upgraded to become SECAP, the launch of the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP), and IFAD's ongoing membership of the Global Environment Facility (GEF). " (MOPAN, 2019)
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	"IFAD's interventions are very relevant to the high-level needs and priorities of partner countries, with country strategies frequently assessed as effective. (…). While IFAD interventions have strong country-level relevance, in some cases weak targeting strategies affect the project's relevance to beneficiaries." (MOPAN, 2019)
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"A strong institutional focus on results that is underpinned by a well-developed results infrastructure. (…). The strong results focus extends to the Fund's evaluation function, which continues to be robust." (MOPAN, 2019) At the same time; "Integration of performance data and lesson learning could be more systematic: IFAD corporate reporting recognises this shortcoming. Several well-developed processes and feedback loops are in

	place for integrating past experience into new intervention designs, but these processes are not applied systematically." (MOPAN, 2019)

Key information and conclusion

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) was established in 1977 as a specialized agency of the United Nations. In 2013, IFAD initiated the 'Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP).

The purpose of ASAP is to invest in rural people and enable them to overcome poverty and achieve food security through remunerative, sustainable and resilient livelihoods. ASAP channels climate and environmental finance to smallholder farmers, scale up climate change adaptation in rural development programmes and mainstream climate adaptation into IFAD's work.

IFAD's highest decision-making body is the Governing Council, which meets annually and is open to all of the Fund's 176 member states.

ASAP focuses on the interests of smallholder farmers, and provides a good mix of support for policy engagement of agricultural institutions and farmer organisations. The programme also supports climate risk assessment, women's empowerment, private-sector engagement, and better use of climate information when planning investments to increase resilience, natural resource management and knowledge management. Furthermore, IFAD seeks to enhance documentation and dissemination of knowledge on approaches to climate-resilient agriculture.

Norway is a significant donor to ASAP 2 (phase 2) with NOK 80 million – equivalent to about USD 9.5 million – to the ASAP Trust Fund. Another key donor is SIDA with USD 5.9 million. This is in additio to Norway's support for the IFAD replenishment, which amounts to NOK 105 million (2016 - 2018).

According to the MOPAN "2017-2018 Assessment of International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)", governments, farmers, indigenous peoples' and private sector organisations in developing countries appreciate IFAD's consultations and involvement. It is seen as agile in responding to demands. However, IFAD is negatively affected by its low pace of disbursement which is detrimental to its results.

The team received highly positive feedback on ASAP in the questionnaire survey. This includes ASAP's methods and learning regarding its gender work.

It is suggested that Norway could consider increasing its contribution to the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP), which has a good reputation for supporting smallholder farmers with adaptation and resilience. It is a good way to approach IFAD's in-country presence and also its good collaboration with line ministries and civil society, including small-scale farmer organisations.

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FAO – Food and Agriculture Organisation

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)**
When the organisation was established	FAO was established in 1945.
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations that leads international efforts to defeat hunger. The goal of FAO is to achieve food security for all and make sure that people have regular access to enough high-quality food to lead active, healthy lives. With over 194 member states, FAO works in over 130 countries worldwide. FAO believes that everyone can play a part in ending hunger. FAO intends to end hunger and poverty without creating resilient livelihoods, e.g. by helping countries and communities and act on threats to agriculture, nutrition and food security. FAO strengthen early warning and disaster risk reduction systems, FAO is ensuring that those who are the most vulnerable to disasters, the rural poor, are more prepared for crises. *FAO-**Adapt*** is a framework programme providing general guidance in the implementation of FAO's multi-disciplinary activities for climate change adaptation. It aims to enhance the coordination, efficiency and visibility of FAO's adaptation work through both short and long-term adaptation measures. FAO's Interdepartmental Working Group on Climate Change and its subgroup on adaptation facilitate the implementation process of FAO-Adapt with five global priority themes defined by the Framework Programme: 1. Data and knowledge for impact and vulnerability assessment 2. Institutions, policies and financing to strengthen capacities for adaptation 3. Sustainable and climate-smart management of land, water and biodiversity 4. Technologies, practices and processes for adaptation 5. Disaster Risk Management The ***Mitigation*** of Climate Change in Agriculture (MICCA) programme strengthens FAO's longstanding work to address climate change in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors and supports countries participating in the climate change negotiation processes within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects)	"The Governing Bodies of FAO consist of the Conference, the Council and supporting committees. Within their respective mandates, they contribute to the definition of the overall policies and regulatory frameworks of FAO and the establishment of the strategic framework, medium term plan, and programme of

- Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	work and budget. They also exercise or contribute to oversight of the administration of FAO. Developing countries have considerable influence in the governance of FAO. The Conference is the sovereign Governing Body and comprises 194 member nations, the European Union, and two associate members (Faroe Islands and Tokelau). It is chaired by an elected member state representative and meets once per biennium. The Council acts as the executive organ of the Conference between sessions and usually meets at least five times per biennium. The Council consists of representatives of 49 member nations elected by the Conference for staggered three-year terms. It is chaired by an Independent Chairperson who is appointed by the Conference for a two-year renewable term." (MOPAN, 2019). "Requirements around governance and climate change are less formalised" (MOPAN, 2019). "FAO's human resources management has lacked sufficient consultation and transparency" (MOPAN, 2019). "It needs to act with urgency on plans to meet International Aid Transparency Initiative standards" (Dfid, 2016).
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	The annual climate finance commitments were 9 million US $ in 2016 and 7 million US $ in 2017. It should be further explored as these figures are surprisingly low (in what FAO has informed to OECD DAC).
Size of portfolio (historically)	"The total budget planned for 2018-19 is USD 2.57 billion, which suggests no significant growth over the previous, 2016-17 biennium" (MOPAN, 2019).
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	"FAO's overall programme of work is funded by assessed (core) and voluntary contributions" (MOPAN, 2019). "For 2018-19, voluntary contributions provided by members and other partners are expected to comprise 61% of FAO's total budget, or about USD 1.6 billion" (MOPAN, 2019). Norwegian contribution to FAO 2018-2019 was 16.8 million NOK.
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	The total FAO Budget planned for 2018-19 is USD 2.6 billion. Of this amount, 39 % comes from assessed contributions paid by member countries, while 61 % will be mobilized through voluntary contributions from Members and other partners. (FAO website). FAO's overall programme of work is funded by assessed and voluntary contributions. Member countries' assessed contributions comprise the regular budget, set at the biennial FAO Conference. The FAO regular budget for the 2018-19 biennium is USD 1,005 million. The voluntary contributions provided by Members and other partners support technical and emergency (including rehabilitation) assistance to governments for clearly defined purposes linked to the results framework, as well as direct

	support to FAO's core work. The ***voluntary*** contributions are expected to reach approximately USD 1,6 billion in 2018-19.
Overall approval and disbursement time	”FAO manages budget execution to a high standard, although it uses results-based budgeting to a limited extent. FAO complies with International Public Sector Accounting Standards, as acknowledged by its external auditor. For the 2016-17 biennium, actual disbursement was 99.6% for the regular budget (predominantly assessed contributions) and 96% for extrabudgetary contributions.” (MOPAN, 2019). “FAO’s administrative and operational processes on the ground can cause great delays” (MOPAN, 2019).
Management ability to handle large contributions	FAO is handling a big budget with USD 2.57 billion for two years.
Main recipients’ countries	Now there are 85 fully-fledged FAO representations or country offices worldwide, while the decentralized office network spans a total of 152 countries, and nearly half of FAO staff (45 percent) are located in these decentralized office (FAO website)
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	Both Adaptation and mitigation. (MOPAN, 2019).
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	“FAO’s recent review of the Strategic Framework established a clear line of sight between the organisation’s work and the Paris Agreement” (MOPAN, 2019).
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	“Evaluations of FAO’s work paint a mixed but broadly positive picture of an organisation that is contributing to sustainable development results” (MOPAN, 2019). Some of FAO’s strength is the following; “FAO has established a clear, compelling and focused strategic vision that bodes well for the future. (..) FAO continues to implement new ways of working, and despite implementation challenges, the assessment finds strong support for the direction of change. (…) The refocusing of FAO’s strategic direction has fostered a more integrated, multidisciplinary way of working.“ (MOPAN, 2019). “FAO demonstrates a strong commitment to working in partnerships. Its knowledge base is one of its key comparative advantages. This strength is evident in responses to the MOPAN partner survey.” (MOPAN, 2019). “FAO is able to demonstrate effective performance in achieving results” (MOPAN, 2019). Besides the FAOs advantages it also have the following areas, where there is room for improvements. First of all “The timeliness of FAO’s administrative and operational processes for delivery needs further attention.” (MOPAN, 2019). Furthermore, “FAO has paid insufficient attention to strategic risk management.

	(..) FAO therefore needs to develop the tools and processes to strengthen its approach to strategic risk management.“ (MOPAN, 2019). “The way in which FAO implemented recent reforms in human resources bears risks. FAO has actively used its human resources (HR) strategy and policies to enhance the agility and relevance of the organisation. (…) FAO’s human resources management has lacked sufficient consultation and transparency.” (MOPAN, 2019). “The efficiency and timeliness of these processes were raised by the 2014 MOPAN assessment and require ongoing attention, as FAO’s administrative and operational processes on the ground can cause great delays (except in its emergency work). The assessment finds that FAO had not done enough to diagnose the root causes of these delays in order to determine whether these stem from procedural or resource- or capacity-related limitations.” (MOPAN, 2019). “FAO needs to develop a more strategic approach to its work on climate change” (Dfid, 2016). “FAO has yet to find sustainable forms of funding for some of its core activities” (MOPAN, 2019).
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	“FAO needs to develop a more strategic approach to its work on climate change” (Dfid, 2016). “FAO has a global leadership role for food and agriculture and plays a critical role in setting norms and standards and agreeing international treaties” (Dfid, 2016).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable	“FAO provides technical assistance and policy advice to governments that help to support the most vulnerable” (Dfid, 2016). “It supports communities in fragile states and those affected by natural disasters to rebuild their livelihoods and become more resilient” (Dfid, 2016). “Its role as a provider of global public knowledge rely on a core budget that has nominally stayed flat throughout the review period [2017-18]” (MOPAN, 2019).

communities.	
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"FAO is able to demonstrate effective performance in achieving results" (MOPAN, 2019). "FAO's administrative and operational processes on the ground can cause great delays" (MOPAN, 2019). "FAO has worked towards ensuring greater accountability to beneficiaries" (Dfid, 2016).
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	"Efficiency savings remain a high priority for FAO, although how well these initiatives translate into efficient programme delivery is less clear." (MOPAN, 2019). "FAO has established sound, high-quality financial management systems and improved its systems of internal control " (MOPAN, 2019).
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"FAO contributes to improvements in the enabling environment but building capacity at multiple levels (individual, institutional and enabling environment) is challenging in practice" (MOPAN, 2019). "Capacity development is recognised as key for sustainability and, as such, is a core modality of FAO's assistance" (MOPAN, 2019). "FAO has yet to find sustainable forms of funding for some of its core activities" (MOPAN, 2019).
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"Gender equality, environmental sustainability and human rights are embedded in intervention planning processes" (MOPAN, 2019). "Despite investment in integrating gender across programmes, the evidence suggests that interventions either still lack gender equality objectives or do not achieve their stated gender equality goals" (MOPAN, 2019).
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects	"FAO programmes are generally strong in terms of relevance to national development goals and regional priorities" (MOPAN, 2019). "Evaluations indicate weaker performance in terms of alignment with the priorities and needs of target groups" (MOPAN, 2019).

safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"FAO has a reasonably developed approach to corporate lesson learning that draws on the reports produced by its independent Office of Evaluation" (MOPAN, 2019).

Key information and conclusion

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations that leads international efforts to defeat hunger. It was established in 1945. FAO intends to end hunger and poverty by creating resilient livelihoods, e.g. by helping countries and communities to face threats to agriculture, nutrition and food security.

Purpose: FAO has two programmes of relevance to climate change: *FAO-Adapt* is a framework programme that provides general guidance in the implementation of FAO's activities for climate change adaptation. FAO also has a programme called *Mitigation* of Climate Change in Agriculture (MICCA).

FAO has 194 member states and works in over 130 countries. Developing countries have considerable influence in its governance, which is headed by a Council of Representatives of 49 member states elected by the Conference. The transparency within FAO is poor, and it needs to act on plans to meet International Aid Transparency Initiative standards.

The total budget planned for 2018-19 is USD 2.57 billion, which suggests no significant growth compared to the previous 2016-17 biennium. The Norwegian contribution to FAO in 2018-2019 was NOK 16.8 million.

FAO has a strong record within agriculture and in supporting countries and communities to act on threats to agriculture, nutrition and food security. According to the MOPAN report; "Assessment of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)" written in 2019, FAOs strengths is its ability to work in partnerships and field offices in many countries. FAO also has a strong record on agriculture and forest development. But there is also room for improvement, as FAO needs to develop a more strategic approach to its work on climate change and has yet to find sustainable forms of funding for some of its core activities.

FAO's work in Africa received positive feedback in the team's questionnaire survey

Norway could explore the scope for contributing earmarked funding to *FAO-Adapt* as part of FAO's activities for climate change adaptation. This could draw on FAOs in-country presence and good collaboration with agriculture ministries and farmer organisations.

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The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**
When the organisation was established	1965
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	UNDP works to eradicate poverty while protecting the planet. We help countries develop strong policies, skills, partnerships and institutions so they can sustain their progress. UNDP supports countries in their efforts to successfully address diverse development challenges, framed around three broad settings which require different forms of support; Eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions: UNDP is looking at both inequalities and poverty in order to leave no one behind, focusing on the dynamics of exiting poverty and of not falling back. This requires addressing interconnected socio-economic, environmental and governance challenges that drive people into poverty or make them vulnerable to falling back into it. Accelerating structural transformations for sustainable development: UNDP support countries as they accelerate structural transformations by addressing inequalities and exclusion, transitioning to zero-carbon development and building more effective governance that can respond to megatrends such as globalization, urbanization and technological and demographic changes. "UNDP is strengthening resilience by supporting governments to take measures to manage risk, prevent, respond and recover more effectively from shocks and crises and address underlying causes in an integrated manner. Such support builds on foundations of inclusive and accountable governance, together with a strong focus on gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls and meeting the needs of vulnerable groups, to ensure that no one is left behind." (UNDP, 2019d)
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability	"UNDP performs well on transparency, achieving the top position on the Aid Transparency Index" (Dfid, 2016). "It has transparent decision-making processes in place to guide resource allocation, and organisational systems are cost and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability" (MOPAN, 2017). "The UNDP Executive Board is made up of representatives from 36 countries around the world who serve on a rotating basis. Through its Bureau, consisting of representatives from five regional groups, the Board oversees and supports the activities of UNDP, ensuring that the organization remains responsive to the evolving needs of programme

- Anti-corruption practices	countries." (UNDP, 2019a) "Any State member that is not a member of the Executive Board may attend Board meetings and participate in its deliberations without the right to vote."(UNDP, 2019b)
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	UNDP's the annual budget was 5.5 billion US $ in revenue in 2018. Unfortunately, UNDP is *not* reporting their climate finance share to OECD-DAC.
Size of portfolio (historically)	Financial resources in 2017: Core 612 million USD, non-core 4,3 billion USD. (Danida, 2018). "Regular resources available to UNDP for 2015 amounted to USD 704 million, a decrease of 21% from what it received in 2013 (USD 896 million)" (MOPAN, 2017).
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	Top 10 core contributors in 2017 are: the US (15%), the UK (14%), Sweden (13%), Japan (13%), Norway (12%), Switzerland (11%), Canada (6%), Netherlands (6%), Germany (5%), Denmark (5%). (Danida, 2018). Norway has always been among the main donors providing core-funding that in 2017 was 535 million NOK equivalent to 65 million USD. The UNDP Global Environmental Finance (UNDP-GEF) Unit partners is catalyzing environmental finance to developing countries. Furthermore, UNDP is an accredited entity for the Adaptation Fund (AF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) that include monitoring and providing specialised technical assistance to the countries implementation.
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	Core funding and implementation of non-core (earmarked) programmes. "UNDP faces continued uncertainty in relation to the magnitude and timing of future funding streams, particularly core funding." (MOPAN, 2017).
Overall approval and disbursement time	"The slow pace of project implementation remains an issue which ultimately delays completion and closure of projects, and affects the ability of UNDP to achieve its objectives and outcomes." (MOPAN, 2017).
Management ability to handle large contributions	"The risk of the misappropriation of funds including corruption is nonetheless evidently prevalent in many of the contexts in which UNDP operates" (Danida, 2018). "Core contributions, the most flexible forms of funding, have stagnated or declined in some cases. In UNDP the proportion of core to non-core contributions reached as low as 12 percent in 2017. This trend not only limits the strategic and flexible use of funding by the UNDS [UN development system], but also invites competition and mandate drift because agencies have to fight to secure funding." (UNDP, 2019c)
Main recipients' countries	UNDP is on the ground in about 170 countries and territories. "UNDP has articulated a clear vision for all developing countries to achieve a zero carbon and environmentally sustainable future. It has an expanding country and regional programme portfolio designed to support effective

	environmental management and nationally owned sustainable development pathways across a range of environmental themes." (MOPAN, 2017).
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	Both adaptation and mitigation.
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	"UNDP has articulated a clear vision for all developing countries to achieve a zero carbon and environmentally sustainable future." (MOPAN, 2017).
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	Findings below are based on the MOPAN report "Assessment of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)" from 2017. Some of the positive assets of UNDP is: "The reduction [in funds available] is largely due to a fall in the volume of donor contributions, and is exacerbated by a strengthening US dollar" (MOPAN, 2017). Besides from this, the following are also advantages; "Strategic plan and organisational architecture well aligned with its overarching long-term vision and draws on its comparative advantage. An organisational structure that supports decentralised decision-making. Top performer in the Aid Transparency Index in 2014 and 2015. (…) Robust organisational systems that are both cost and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability. A corporate commitment to results-based management." (MOPAN, 2017). Besides from the above assets, UNDP also have some of the areas, which could be improved; "UNDP is already stretched thin across a wide sectoral mandate and a very large number of countries and territories. If regular resources continue to decrease at the current rate, it will not be possible for UNDP to maintain the protections for the programme budget that are currently in place" (MOPAN, 2017). Aside from this, UNDP is not very efficient of effective; "UNDP is delivering some interventions efficiently from both a resource and cost perspective" (MOPAN, 2017). "However, there is also evidence to indicate that efficiency is low, on the whole" (MOPAN, 2017). Furthermore, often "delays to the implementation of UNDP interventions, (…) caused by UNDP's burdensome bureaucratic procedures" (MOPAN, 2017). Furthermore, there is a challenge "of implementing ongoing organisational and operational reform, and maintaining such a broad sectoral and geographical focus, in the context of reduced core funding. Strengthen procurement capacity at the country office level. Strengthen the systematic analysis of partner (institutional) capacity and cross-cutting issues, particularly gender, to inform programme design. Better corporate guidance on the requirements for developing theories of change and more consistent application to programming. Improve the quality and use of decentralised evaluations, and lesson learning

	more generally. Improve the efficiency and sustainability of interventions." (MOPAN, 2017)
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"UNDP's operating model and human/financial resources generally support relevance and agility" (MOPAN, 2017). "The decentralised nature of the organisation is a major strength and contributes to relevance as it allows UNDP the flexibility to adapt to different contexts and to promote greater national ownership of programmes" (MOPAN, 2017).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	"Mixed performance in terms of the extent to which interventions have achieved their stated development and/or humanitarian objectives and delivered the results expected" (MOPAN, 2017).
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"UNDP has a strong and transparent results focus that is geared to function " (MOPAN, 2017). "Often delays to the implementation of UNDP interventions, (…) caused by UNDP's burdensome bureaucratic procedures" (MOPAN, 2017). "Evidence suggests more progress is needed on human resourcing, risk management, monitoring and evaluation, and programme delivery, including scope for improved country-level analysis" (Dfid, 2016)"
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the	"UNDP is delivering some interventions efficiently from both a resource and cost perspective" (MOPAN, 2017). "However, there is also evidence to indicate that efficiency is low, on the

portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	whole" (MOPAN, 2017). "Ongoing structural reform is anticipated, including the regional and global clustering of operations functions, which is expected to bring further economies and efficiencies" (MOPAN, 2017)
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"Sustainability remains a challenge and the limited available evidence casts doubt on the likelihood that benefits from many UNDP interventions will be sustained " (MOPAN, 2017). "UNDP's contribution to building capacity and strengthening the enabling environment, particularly policy, is good" (MOPAN, 2017).
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"Structures and tools are in place and applied to support the integration of gender and women's empowerment across the UNDP's work" (MOPAN, 2017). "Some survey respondents also suggested that UNDP could be more responsive to the needs of socially excluded groups" (MOPAN, 2017).
h. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	"Documentary evidence and survey respondents both indicate that UNDP interventions contribute to the realisation of national development goals and objectives" (MOPAN, 2017).
i. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"UNDP has corporate independent evaluation functions and monitoring systems" (MOPAN, 2017). "However concerns remain over the funding of the evaluation programme and the quality of decentralised evaluations" (MOPAN, 2017).

Key information and conclusion

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was established in 1965.

Purpose: The UNDP has the dual mandate of supporting individual country-led efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda and playing a leading role in ensuring a coherent and a coordinated UN development system engagement at the country level.

UNDP's offices and staff are on the ground in 170 countries and territories, working with governments and local communities in developing policies, skills, partnerships and institutions. UNDP has three focus areas; eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, accelerating structural transformations for sustainable development and building resilience to crises and shocks.

The UNDP Executive Board is made up of representatives from 36 countries around the world who serve on a rotating basis, any state member that has no representative on the Executive Board may attend Board meetings and participate in its deliberations without the right to vote. The UNDP is highly transparent in its decision-making processes.

The UNDP annual budget was USD 5.5 billion in 2018. Unfortunately, the UNDP does *not* report its climate finance share to the OECD-DAC. Norway has always been among the main donors, providing core funding of NOK 535 million (USD 65 million) in 2017.

The UNDP Global Environmental Finance (UNDP-GEF) Unit partners are catalysing environmental finance to developing countries. Furthermore, the UNDP is an accredited entity for the Adaptation Fund (AF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), including monitoring and providing specialised technical assistance to the countries' implementation.

A key source for this assessment is the MOPAN report from 2017: "Assessment of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)." The UNDP is recognized for its strategic planning and organisational architecture being well aligned with its overarching long-term vision. Furthermore, the UNDP has an organisational structure that supports decentralised decision-making. UNDP has a strong strategic plan and organisational architecture, though its procedures are criticised for being overly bureaucratic, which causes delays and lowers efficiency.

Indeed, the UNDP scores poorly for effectiveness and efficiency. Although some of its interventions are delivered efficiently, there is evidence to suggest that its overall cost-efficiency is rather low. UNDP interventions are often delayed due to the organisation's burdensome red tape. The UNDP's high share of earmarked contributions also limits the strategic and flexible use of funding and contributes to competition and mandate drift.

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The United Nation Environment Programme (UNEP)

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**United Nation Environment Programme (UNEP)**
When the organisation was established	UNEP was founded in 1972 as a result of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference).
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	UNEP has overall responsibility for environmental problems among United Nations agencies. The mission of UNEP is to provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of future generations. UNEP categorize its work into seven broad thematic areas: 1. Climate Change: UNEP work to minimize the scale and impact of climate change. 2. Disasters and conflict: UNEP work to minimize the environmental causes and consequences of crises. 3. Ecosystem management: UNEP protect and restore ecosystems and the goods and services they provide. 4. Environmental governance: UNEP support strong laws and institutions for a healthy planet and healthy people. 5. Chemicals and waste: UNEP work to minimize the adverse effects of chemicals and waste on human health and the environment. 6. Resource efficiency: UNEP work to accelerate the transition to resource-efficient and sustainable economies. 7. Environment under review: UNEP empower governments and other stakeholders in evidence-based decision-making. UNEP maintain the overarching commitment to sustainability in all of UNEPs work.(UNEP, 2019c) UNEP performs "secretariat function for a number of Multilateral Environmental agreements and frameworks, and managing dedicated trust funds." (Danida, 2015).
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making	"UNEP is governed by the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA)." (MOPAN, 2017). "The Executive Office at its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, runs UNEP operations" (MOPAN, 2017). "UNEP works through five divisions, six regional offices and a regional support office at headquarters, five sub-regional offices, five country offices, and three

processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	liaison offices. It also has a network of collaborating centres of excellence, and hosts various environmental conventions, secretariats and inter-agency coordinating bodies." (MOPAN, 2017). "UNEP is governed by the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA), which formerly was the Governing Council of UNEP. The first UNEA meeting in 2014 formalised the transformation of the Governing Council into the Assembly. The UNEA meets every two years to make strategic decisions and provide political guidance on global environmental issues. (…) UNEP's open-ended Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) represents the UN Environment Assembly between the biennial meetings. The Secretariat of Governing Bodies (SGB) is responsible for supporting the UN Environment Assembly and the Committee of Permanent Representatives, which are UNEP's governing bodies. " (MOPAN, 2017). "The crosscutting area of good governance is not given such explicit attention across UNEP's strategies." (MOPAN, 2017). "A single integrated budgetary framework ensures [financial] transparency" (MOPAN, 2017). "Decision making appears fair, evidence-based and in line with organisational priorities." (MOPAN, 2017). "UNEP could facilitate greater internal transparency and awareness by better documenting the rationale for resource allocation decisions." (MOPAN, 2017). "The Assembly is the governing body of the UN Environment Programme (UN Environment) and the successor of its Governing Council, which was composed of 58 member States. The UN Environment Assembly, with a universal membership, is now composed of 193 Member States." (UNEP, 2019b)
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	Annual budget and budget for climate finance is 40 mio. US $, see figure X chapter 4.
Size of portfolio (historically)	"Since 2014-15, Global Environment Facility (GEF) projects have been included in UNEPs programme of work (PoW) and reflected in the budget (GEF funding accounted for 31% of UNEPs total 2014-15 biennium budget). " (MOPAN, 2017). "Several sub-programme areas (especially climate change and ecosystem management) are heavily dependent on GEF funding." (MOPAN, 2017). "In June 2014 UNEA approved the revised Programme of Work (PoW) and Budget for 2014-15 in the amount of USD 245 million and for 2016-17 in the amount of USD 271 million (both amounts refer to the Environment Fund)." (Danida, 2015). "In 2014-15 UNEP receives USD 34.9 million from the regular UN budget which is a substantial increase in UNEP´s share since 1978 and is part of the follow up to the Rio+20 Conference, which underlined the need for increased financial resources for UNEP." (Danida, 2015)

Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	From 2017-2018 the following main donors have contributed to UNEP with the following amount Germany (17,2 million US $), Netherlands (15,5 million), and Sweden (9,9 million US $) to the environmental fund. Norway contributed with 6 million US $ in 2017-2018 (UNEP, 2019a) Top contributors to the Environmental Fund (in million USD in 2018): 1. Netherlands 9,1 2. Germany 8,9 3. France 7,6 4. USA 6,1 5. Sweden 5,1 6. Belgium 4,6 7. UK 4,3 8. Switzerland 3,8 9. Norway 3,0 Top contributors to Earmarked Funds (in million USD in 2018): 10. GEF 126 11. UN sister organisations 48 12. Private sector 26 13. Green Climate Fund 26 14. EC 21 15. Denmark 16 16. Norway 15 "In 2015 […] only 39% of the 193 member states made contributions." (MOPAN, 2017).
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	UNEP depends on voluntary contributions. "UNEP is almost entirely funded by direct, voluntary contributions, largely from Member States". (Danida, 2015). "In the biennium 2014-15, the Environment Fund constituted just under 20% of UNEP's overall funding." (MOPAN, 2017). "Member states, UN bodies, other organisations, non-state actors and individuals provide earmarked contributions to UNEP to fund specific programme activities, services and facilities. This allows member states to target their priority issues by directly funding specific UNEP activities." (MOPAN, 2017). "Donors are being encouraged to shift towards un-earmarked funding, but the ratio between core and earmarked funding remains uneven and has contributed to some areas being inadequately funded." (MOPAN, 2017).
Overall approval and disbursement time	"Resources are generally disbursed as planned." (MOPAN, 2017). "Financial and budgetary planning ensures that all priority areas have adequate funding in the short term or are at least given clear priority in cases where funding is very limited" (MOPAN, 2017).
Management ability to handle large contributions	"Expenditure: USD 796 mio. (2015)" (MOPAN, 2017). "Core contributions, the most flexible forms of funding, have stagnated or declined in some cases. (…) This trend not only limits the strategic

	and flexible use of funding by the UNDS [UN development system], but also invites competition and mandate drift because agencies have to fight to secure funding." (UNDP, 2019c)
Main recipients	"UNEP was established (…) to promote the coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development within the UN system and to serve as an authoritative advocate for the global environment. "(MOPAN, 2017). The projects do not focus on a specific category of countries.
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	UNEP is supporting both mitigation and adaptation
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	"UNEP has a medium-term strategy set within a longer-term vision (Vision 2030). Its current strategy is for the period 2014-17, and it recently approved a 2018-21 medium-term strategy. Its current biennial programme of work is for the years 2016 and 2017. UNEP has seven cross-cutting thematic priorities: Climate change: to strengthen the ability of countries to integrate climate change responses into national development processes." (MOPAN, 2017).
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	UNEP is the leading organisation to coordinate environmental matters within the UN system that sets the global environmental agenda, promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development and serves as an authoritative advocate for the global environment. UNEP produces environmental assessments and analyses, norms, guidelines, and methods for use by stakeholders looking for guidance on how to effectively manage the environment for sustainable development and green economic growth. (Danida 2015). Based on the MOPAN assessment from 2017, UNEP is evaluated overall as follows. "*The overall conclusion of the 2016 MOPAN assessment is that while there are some areas where performance can be improved, UNEP meets the requirements of an effective multilateral organisation. UNEP shows continued strength in terms of being a global authority on environmental issues and providing a robust evidence base for advocacy and policy dialogue.*" (MOPAN, 2017). Key strengths are: - Long-term planning horizons and results framework provide clear vision and strategic direction. - Organisational architecture well aligned with mandate and comparative advantages, with matrix management system now well embedded. - Good compliance with audit findings, and operates in accordance with UN financial regulations. - Systems in place to integrate analysis of cross-cutting issues into operations and project/programme design processes." (MOPAN, 2017). - Furthermore "UNEP has been able to apply its assets relatively efficiently and effectively, and to maximum advantage in many instances." (MOPAN, 2017). Besides from this "UNEP's demonstration of its relevance is assessed as positive, particularly at the global level" (MOPAN, 2017).

	There is need for improvements in the following areas; "Regional strengthening and changes to delegation of authority framework should further drive decentralisation, but they will need to be monitored to ensure effectiveness. Strong gender policy/architecture now in place, but unclear whether gender results are being delivered at the project level. Application of results-based budgeting still work in progress. Alignment and integration with other UN agencies need to be better demonstrated, especially where there is potential overlap at a national level. Additionally, there is overall "a lack of post-intervention monitoring and assessment to determine the actual sustainability of results." (MOPAN, 2017). Furthermore "The evaluation team is stretched and under-resourced compared to the evaluation tasks at hand." (MOPAN, 2017).

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"UNEP's demonstration of its relevance is assessed as positive, particularly at the global level" (MOPAN, 2017). "UNEP could more clearly document the relevance of its interventions at the national level and the actual results/benefits delivered to target beneficiaries. In general, UNEP reporting tends to focus more on activities and outputs than on outcomes and impact." (MOPAN, 2017).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	"UNEP often drive global dialogue on climate change." (MOPAN, 2017). "Evidence of successful initiatives includes the Climate and Clean Air Coalition and the Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition; examples of increasing the information base include the emissions gap reports and the Climate Technology Centre and Network." (MOPAN, 2017).
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual	"UNEP is assessed as having a sound operational model, and has in place the appropriate policies, processes and procedures that are expected of a well-functioning multilateral organisation "(MOPAN, 2017). "Country-level evidence of UNEP's contribution to actual results and impacts in the climate change area is often weak or vague." (MOPAN, 2017) "At the country level there remains some risk of duplication and overlap with the work of other agencies especially in programming areas such as energy,

activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	climate change and disaster risk management." (MOPAN, 2017).
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	"Financial resource allocation processes across the organisation are reasonably efficient, flexible and responsive to the changing needs and priorities of the organisation and member states." (MOPAN, 2017). "UNEP has been able to apply its assets relatively efficiently and effectively, and to maximum advantage in many instances." (MOPAN, 2017). "UNEP remains a relatively centralised organisation and at times this can reduce operational efficiency, particularly at the regional and national level". (MOPAN, 2017).
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"UNEP is committed to following United Nations Development Group (UNDG) guidelines on mainstreaming environmental sustainability in country-level planning." (MOPAN, 2017). "Overall there is a lack of post-intervention monitoring and assessment to determine the actual sustainability of results." (MOPAN, 2017). "Evaluation documentation also suggests that few projects articulate a clear sustainability/exit strategy, that the actual sustainability of results is at times overestimated, and that project time frames are often insufficient to build sustainable institutional capacity." (MOPAN, 2017).
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"UNEP has a clear safeguards policy framework in place and adheres to UN-wide principles on human rights and the rights of indigenous people." (MOPAN, 2017). "Gender has received greater focus in strategic planning and project design." (MOPAN, 2017). "But there are weaknesses when it comes to the analysis and integration of broader governance and social justice issues, and UNEP needs to devote greater attention to this area." (MOPAN, 2017).
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity	

NBSAP) and also energy plans.	
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"UNEP has a reasonably independent Evaluation Office, which works effectively and efficiently." (MOPAN, 2017) "The evaluation team is stretched and under-resourced compared to the evaluation tasks at hand." (MOPAN, 2017). "Greater use of performance data and lessons learned from past interventions would strengthen planning outcomes." (MOPAN, 2017)

Key information and conclusion

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was established in 1972 and has overall responsibility for environmental problems within the UN system.

The purpose of UNEP is to promote coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development among United Nations agencies. Furthermore, UNEP serves as an authoritative advocate for the global environment. UNEP works within the area of climate change, disasters and conflict, ecosystem management, environmental governance, chemicals and waste, resource efficiency, and environment under review. UNEP empowers governments and other stakeholders in evidence-based decision-making.

The governing body of UNEP is the Environment Assembly, currently composed of 193 Member States, which meets every year in Nairobi. It has approved the Medium-Term Strategy 2018-2021. UNEP is recognised by developing countries for being headquartered in Nairobi.

In 2017-2018, the following main donors contributed to UNEP: Germany (USD 17.2 million), the Netherlands (USD 15.5 million), and Sweden (USD 9.9 million). Norway contributed USD 6 million in 2017-2018 (UNEP, 2019a). These donations are divided between the Environment Fund (core funding) and earmarked donations (see details in the annex). Unfortunately, UNEP does *not* report its climate finance share to the OECD-DAC.

UNEP is doing excellent analytic and policy work, e.g. the annual Adaptation Gap reports and the Global Environment Outlook (GEO) series.

UNEP is the leading organisation in coordinating environmental matters within the UN system, which sets the global environmental agenda, promotes coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development and serves as an authoritative advocate for the global environment. UNEP produces environmental assessments and analyses, norms, guidelines, and methods for use by stakeholders looking for guidance on how to effectively manage the environment for sustainable development and green economic growth (Danida 2015).

A key source for this assessment is the MOPAN report from 2017: "*United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Institutional Assessment Report". It is found that UNEP meets the requirements of an effective multilateral organisation. UNEP shows continued strength in terms of being a global authority on environmental issues and providing a robust evidence base for advocacy and policy dialogue.*"

UNEP has the same problem as UNDP that its procedures can be burdensome and bureaucratic and that its donors are increasingly earmarking their contributions, which tends to defund certain strategic interventions and areas. Quoting from Danida 2015: "*Insufficient funds and imbalance between core funding and ear-marked funding: The ratio between core funding and ear-marked funding has become increasingly imbalanced during the last years. Such an imbalance could risk undermining the strategic priorities and fragmenting the work of UNEP.*"

Norway should consider increasing its funding of UNEP's activities within climate change. Norway is already providing considerable core funding of UNEP, which contributes to the organisation's core capacity and excellent analytic and policy work.

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Other international organisations and regional initiatives

Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)**
When the organisation was established	GGGI initiated in 2010 as a South Korean foundation and was in 2012 transformed into an international organisation. "Initiated at the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development" (IEU, 2017). GGGI's objectives and activities in support of developing countries and emerging economies are detailed in the Establishment Agreement ratified by Member countries in 2012. Membership to GGGI is open to any member state of the United Nations that subscribes to the organizations goals and objectives. Regional integration organizations are also eligible for GGGI membership. GGGI's governance structure, as outlined in the Agreement, includes an Assembly, a Council, and the Institute.
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) is a treaty-based international, inter-governmental organization dedicated to supporting and promoting strong, inclusive and sustainable economic growth in developing countries and emerging economies.
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	"GGGI has a governance structure consisting of an Assembly, Council and Secretariat with headquarters in Seoul. Part of GGGI's strength lies with its unique governance structure where all members, not only donors, decide in consensus." (Danida, 2017). "GGGI's anti-corruption policy and zero tolerance towards corruption is well described and communicated" (Danida, 2017). GGGI's objectives and activities in support of developing countries and emerging economies are detailed in the Establishment Agreement ratified by Member countries in 2012. Membership to GGGI is open to any member state of the United Nations that subscribes to the organizations goals and objectives. Regional integration organizations are also eligible for GGGI membership. The Assembly also elects Council members, appoints a Director-General, and reviews the organization's progress.
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	Income in 2018; 35,4 million USD (corefunding 24 million and earmarked funds 11 million) according to audited annual account. This is an increase compared with 30 million in 2017.

Size of portfolio (historically)	14 achieved projects in 2017 and 17 active projects in 2018 (GGGI, 2018b). ”GGGI continues to grow globally by gradually expanding its membership” (IEU, 2017).
Main donors (including Norway’s contribution)	“Major donors are South Korea, Norway, UK, Australia, UAE, Indonesia and Denmark. EU is currently discussing membership.” (Danida, 2017). According to GGGI's the audited annual account for 2018, Norway is by far the biggest contributor to corefunding to GGGI in 2018 with 10 million USD, which is 41% of the total core fund revenue of 241 million USD. This was a similar situation in 2017. Furthermore, Norway is earmarked to specific programmes, as with 27,1 million NOK for Columbia to fight against deforestation (Colombia Country Programme from 2017 to 2019). Norway has also financed the Indonesia Country Programme from 2017 to 2019 with 178 million NOK.
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	” Only part of the future funding has been secured. Changes in donor contributions could have a significant impact on GGGI’s financial position. The organisation is therefore carefully seeking to address the issue through a range of resource mobilisation initiatives. A likely outcome will be that more funding will become earmarked” (Danida, 2017).
Management ability to handle large contributions	” GGGI has been unable to use the funding envelope in the start-up phase and expenditure execution against budget has been low in previous years. However, improvements were seen in 2016, with an execution rate of 75%, up from 68 % in 2015 and 63 % in 2014” (Danida, 2017).
Main recipients’ countries	A multitude of recipients countries, ranging from China, Uganda, to Colombia etc.
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	“With the increased number of Least Developed Countries, there has been an increased focus on adaptation aspects” (Danida, 2017).
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	“GGGI’s work is firmly rooted in the international development goals, including the SDGs and the Paris Agreement.” (Danida, 2017). GGGI’s *Strategic Plan 2015-2020* states that “Working across the thematic priorities of sustainable energy, green cities, sustainable landscapes, and water & sanitation, GGGI aims to deliver impact through six strategic outcomes: 1. GHG emission reduction 2. Creation of green jobs 3. Increased access to sustainable services, such as, clean affordable energy, sustainable public transport, improved sanitation, and sustainable waste management 4. Improved air quality 5. Adequate supply of ecosystem services

	6. Enhanced adaptation to climate change" (GGGI, 2017).
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	"GGGI awarded A+ rating by DFID for the first time" (GGGI, 2018a). "GGGI has developed a significant partnership with GCF (Green Climate Fund" (Danida, 2017). "GGGI's unique strength is that its country offices are embedded in ministries (finance, planning, energy, etc.) of their member countries from where it can help countries identify their green growth potential that are translated into concrete strategies, planning and budgeting for green growth" (Danida, 2017). "GGGI is a young organisation and in a build-up and change process, therefore a great deal of uncertainty exists as to the future financial sustainability, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the organization" (Danida, 2017). "Multi-lateral development banks (World Bank and IDB) indicated interest and potential for GGGI to work as technical partners and/ or executing agency with them in Colombia" (IEU, 2017). "GGGI should take a more active role in promoting South-South cooperation" (IEU, 2017).
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"GGGI works closely with partner countries in implementing the NDCs (National Determined Contributions) and links directly up with particularly the following SDGs 1. No poverty, 6. Clean water & sanitation, 7. Affordable and Clean Energy, 8. Decent work and economic growth, 11. Sustainable cities and communities, 12 Responsible consumption and production, 13. Climate action, 15. Life on Land and 17. Partnership goals" (Danida, 2017). "GGGI has produced noteworthy results in developing green policies in most member countries." (IEU, 2017).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting	"GGGI has delivered results at output level but needs to demonstrate tangible outcomes for green growth, ensure systematic knowledge generation, consolidate its organisation and more strongly embed all new initiatives" (Danida, 2017). "A key challenge for GGGIis to demonstrate its value and potential in facilitating transformational change, create bankable projects and green

global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	growth investments." (Danida, 2017). "Half of GGGI's portfolio is upon insistence from Denmark and other donors focused on LDCs" (Danida, 2017). "GGGI has in the past years achieved its goals of leveraging Green investments but this sector needs to grow significantly" (Danida, 2017).
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"GGGI must create an organisation that delivers as one. The quick expansion of staff is a key managerial challenge for the organisation to ensure quality and coherence in all corners of the organization. This includes ensuring integration between headquarters and country deliverables as well as between deliverables from different divisions as well as ensuring synergy between country programmes and bankable projects" (Danida, 2017). "GGGI's communication is making progress and becoming more focused but there are still quite a number of initiatives to be taken to ensure more effective communication" (Danida, 2017).
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	"GGGI has given priority to and allocated relevant resources to maintain focus on developing a sound financial management set-up." (Danida, 2017). "GGGI has been unable to use the funding envelope in the start-up phase and expenditure execution against budget has been low in previous years. However, improvements were seen in 2016, with an execution rate of 75%, up from 68 % in 2015 and 63 % in 2014" (Danida, 2017). "GGGI has demonstrated significant early wins ($236 million – mostly from Colombia and Ethiopia)" (IEU, 2017). "GGGI must sharpen its approach to resource mobilization" (IEU, 2017).
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"As is recognized by GGGI the output level monitored does not provide much information about actual results in relation to green growth change and higher-level outcomes" (Danida, 2017). "GGGI should consider alternative business models which will lead to long-term sustainability" (IEU, 2017).
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"GGGI has in the last year continued to focus on pro-poor growth and social inclusion" (Danida, 2017). "A gender strategy was finalized in 2016. However, these aspects still need to be translated into actual impacts on the ground" (Danida, 2017).

g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	"GGGI's unique strength is that its country offices are embedded in ministries (finance, planning, energy, etc.) of their member countries from where it can help countries identify their green growth potential that are translated into concrete strategies, planning and budgeting for green growth. GGGI also assists in policy design and preparation of bankable projects. For example, GGGI facilitated Mongolia's National Action Plan for Green Development." (Danida, 2017). "GGGI's primary modality of being embedded in a government ministry is generally positive; however, there is a potential risk of political capture, and/or lack of influence over other external ministries" (IEU, 2017).
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"GGGI needs to improve its documentation of results, not just its activities and processes, in order to demonstrate its value" (Danida, 2017).

Key information and conclusions

The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) was launched in 2010 as a South Korean foundation and was transformed into an international organisation in 2012.
Purpose: The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) is a treaty-based international, inter-governmental organization dedicated to supporting and promoting strong, inclusive and sustainable economic growth in developing countries and emerging economies.

Sustainable Development. GGGI is oriented towards a model of green growth, thus contributing to its vision of a resilient world of strong, inclusive and sustainable growth. GGGI's unique strength is that its country offices are embedded in ministries (finance, planning, energy, etc.) of its member countries from where it can help countries identify their green growth potential. This is translated into concrete strategies, planning and budgeting for green growth.

GGGI has a governance structure consisting of an Assembly, Council and Secretariat with headquarters in Seoul. Membership is open to any member state of the United Nations that subscribes to the organization's goals and objectives. Regional integration organizations are also eligible for GGGI membership.

GGGI's income in 2018; USD 35.4 million (core funding 24 million and earmarked funds 11 million). This is an increase compared with 30 million in 2017. Major donors are South Korea, Norway, UK, Australia, UAE, Indonesia and Denmark. According to GGGI's audited annual account for 2018, Norway is by far the biggest contributor to core funding, amounting to USD 10 million in 2018, which is 41% of total core fund revenue of USD 24,1 million USD. This was a similar situation in 2017.

Furthermore, Norway earmarks its contributions to specific programmes, as with NOK 27.1 million for Colombia to fight deforestation (Colombia Country Programme from 2017 to 2019). Norway has also financed the Indonesia Country Programme from 2017 to 2019 with NOK 178 million.

It should be noticed that GGGI has been awarded A+ rating by DFID for the first time (GGGI, 2018a). This is impressive in view of the institute's many weaknesses in its first years from 2010 to 2015 (Danida was very active in highlighting these problems).

”GGGI’s unique strength is that its country offices are embedded in ministries (finance, planning, energy, etc.) of their member countries from where it can help countries identify their green growth potential that are translated into concrete strategies, planning and budgeting for green growth” (Danida, 2017).

GGGI also assists in policy design and preparation of bankable projects, which is of considerable interest among the multilateral development banks. GGGI’s focus is mostly on mitigation and not so much on adaptation.

Furthermore, GGGI has developed a significant partnership with GCF (Green Climate Fund, Danida, 2017)

One weakness is that GGGI needs to improve its documentation of results in order to demonstrate its value. GGGI has been criticised for not meeting LDCs’ needs and priorities. Responding to this, the GGGI has, from 2017 onwards, begun to focus on pro-poor growth and social inclusion. Another concern is that “GGGI’s primary modality of being embedded in a government ministry is generally positive; however, there is a potential risk of political capture, and/or lack of influence over other external ministries” (IEU, 2017). GGGI has its own internal evaluation unit IEU.

It makes sense for Norway to continue its substantial support for GGGI, which has shown an impressive capacity to overcome the numerous problems of its initial years (having recently been awarded A+ rating by DFID). GGGI fills an important gap by having its country offices embedded in ministries (finance, planning, energy, etc.) and by assisting in policy design and preparation of bankable projects to be presented to multilateral development banks, mostly on adaptation. Norway could also explore the scope for strengthening GGGI's role in the field of adaptation.

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The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)**
When the organisation was established	The Africa Renewable Energy initiative (AREI) was launched at the COP21 and was established in 2016, endorsed by 54 African Heads of State. It is currently hosted by the African Development Bank (AfdB).
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	The Africa Renewable Energy initiative (AREI) has two main goals: 1) to help achieve sustainable development, enhanced well-being, and sound economic development by ensuring universal access to sufficient amounts of clean, appropriate and affordable energy. 2) to help African countries leapfrog to renewable energy systems that support their low-carbon development strategies while enhancing economic and energy security." (2030spotlight, 2019) The initiative is set to achieve at least 10 GW of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020, and mobilize the African potential to generate at least 300 GW by 2030. "Among the nine essential work areas in its ambitious Action Plan, AREI emphasizes the need for coordination and mapping of existing initiatives, capacity-building, and provision of bold, programmatic country-wide incentives and regulations, including guarantees for long-term investment security such as tariff- and off-take guarantees (feed-in tariffs). AREI also highlights the importance of civil society participation and multi-stakeholder involvement, as well as social and environmental safeguards and precautionary technology assessments." (2030spotlight, 2019) The core working areas of AREI are: • Mapping of renewable energy policies, regulations, experiences and programmes • Strengthening of policy, regulatory and support frameworks • Capacity mobilization and building • Mobilization of finance for incentives and investment • Project development and support The cross-cutting working areas of AREI are: • Socio-economic and environmental assessments of renewable energy technologies • Multi-stakeholder engagement • Wider context monitoring and assessment

	• Communications and outreach (AREI, 2019)
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	AREI is currently the only Africa-owned and Africa-led energy initiative and is thereby a promising opportunity for regional energy cooperation on the continent. The Board of Directors has seven voting members (five African heads of state or government and two African institutions – the African Union Commission and the African Development Bank). France and the European Commission are on the Board of Directors as observing members. The main role of the Board is to ensure African ownership of the Initiative, provide strategic oversight and vision, mobilize political support, foster and drive resource mobilization efforts, oversee implementation and enter into legal arrangements with entities serving as the Trustee, host of AREI-related bodies and other entities. (AREI, 2019). Civil society organizations are campaigning for greater opportunities for participation and transparency in AREI in order to effectively support its development and the start of implementation. (German Climate Finance). *https://www.germanclimatefinance.de/2019/08/05/arei-needs-to-speed-up-to-secure-support-for-an-african-energy-transition/*
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	The fund was established in 2016-2017.
Size of portfolio (historically)	The Establishment phase (2016-2017): Formal initiation of AREI work plan Phase I (2017-2020): Enabling activities and project and programme support towards 10 GW of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity. Phase II (2020-2030): Full-scale roll-out of nationally determined transformative policies, programmes and incentives adding at least 300 GW RE by 2030. (AREI, 2017)
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	AREI has received funding commitments of around $1,7 billion for the initiative itself as well as donor commitments of $11,5 billion dollars for projects. With €1.2 billion in 2016, Germany was the largest bilateral donor in the group consisting of the G7, the European Commission, France, Sweden and the Netherlands, which together made more than $4.3 billion in new pledges for renewable energy, power transmission and energy efficiency in Africa. However, Germany plans to make this contribution through ongoing climate finance projects in the field of renewable energies. (German Climate Finance).
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	There are three different streams of funds relating to AREI. While the AREI Trust Fund is yet to be established, initial funding has materialised for the first two streams: 1) independent delivery unit and 2) attributed activities or AREI trust funds. (AREI, 2017)

Management ability to handle large contributions	AREI is currently hosted by the African Development Bank (AfdB).
Main recipients' countries	African countries
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	The focus is primarily on mitigation
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	"AREI is set to add at least 300 GW renewable energy (i.e., adding more than double current energy generation on the continent) by 2030, and an initial 10 GW by 2020 (a doubling of current rates)." (2030spotlight, 2019)
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	AREI is a quite new finance channel and it have only been possible to find very few assessments of AREI. The assessment of AREI is based on progress in 2016, which was before the establishment of AREI. The following findings is based on AREI's own assessment from January 2017. The strengths of AREI are: "AREI Criteria for attribution and funding have been developed through the participation and input from governments and stakeholders (…). These Criteria ensure AREI principles are adhered to and that African ownership is guaranteed. " (AREI, 2017) "Analysis of options, potential and funding needs for comprehensive, country- wide policy approaches that can enable African countries to quickly move towards full focus on renewable energy has been initiated (see also page 13). " (AREI, 2017) "An AREI orientation event for all African Union ambassadors and African organizations represented in Ethiopia was held in Addis Ababa on 24th October 2016 and a meeting of Experts and Ministers in charge of Energy of ECOWAS Member States took place in Conakry, Guinea on 7th December 2016. A Ministerial roundtable was also held on 15th of January at the margins of the 7th Assembly of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi. Further outreach sessions will be held in each sub- region as well as at country levels during 2017. " (AREI, 2017) The weaknesses of AREI are: *"The IDU has been formally operational since August 2016 when its Head assumed duty at the African Development Bank in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. To ensure continuity and smooth implementation of the various activities over the establishment phase of the initiative, the IDU is supported by high-level experts consisting of the AREI drafting team and others within the AREI network. In addition, an oversight committee representing the Co-*

	Leaders of AREI has been supporting the efforts of the IDU." (AREI, 2017)
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	AREI is a quite new finance channel and it have only been possible to find very few assessments of AREI. The team got sceptical assessment from an expert with specialisation in renewal energy in Africa as well as from German Watch. Although an Independent Delivery Unit (IDU) in summer 2018 now is operational, implementation has been delayed considerable compared with the 2020 target to achieve at least 10 GW of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity. Moreover, the inclusion of multiple stakeholders has been an issue as well. At the regional consultations in 2018 and early 2019, many countries were not represented and the participation of diverse actors (such as civil society) was not facilitated, except for East Africa. To express the need of involving the civil society in the African energy debates and AREI processes, the African civil society, represented through ACSEA, sent a letter of concern to the IDU on 10th June 2019. This letter highlighted the different occasions at which AREI neglected to ensure a substantial participation from African civil society and to grant access to key documents and meetings. For AREI to be an effective channel to accelerate progress on electricity access and scale up the implementation of renewable energy in Africa, these participation and transparency issues have to be resolved. Current slow and non-transparent project implementation may encourage the present donors to look for other cooperation possibilities on the African continent.

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"AREI Criteria for attribution and funding have been developed through the participation and input from governments and stakeholders (see also page 11). These Criteria ensure AREI principles are adhered to and that African ownership is guaranteed. " (AREI, 2017)
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level.	"Analysis of options, potential and funding needs for comprehensive, country- wide policy approaches that can enable African countries to quickly move towards full focus on renewable energy has been initiated (see also page 13). " (AREI, 2017)

- Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights,	Following safeguards from the African Development Bank.

gender, minorities)	
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	"An AREI orientation event for all African Union ambassadors and African organizations represented in Ethiopia was held in Addis Ababa on 24th October 2016 (…) Ministerial roundtable was also held on 15th of January at the margins of the 7th Assembly of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi. Further outreach sessions will be held in each sub- region as well as at country levels during 2017. " (AREI, 2017)
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"The IDU has been formally operational since August 2016 when its Head assumed duty at the African Development Bank in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. To ensure continuity and smooth implementation of the various activities over the establishment phase of the initiative, the IDU is supported by high-level experts consisting of the AREI drafting team and others within the AREI network. In addition, an oversight committee representing the Co-Leaders of AREI has been supporting the efforts of the IDU." (AREI, 2017)

Key information and conclusions

The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) was launched at the COP21 and began to operate in 2017, endorsed by 54 African Heads of State under the aegis of the African Union.

Purpose: AREI's thematic focus is primarily on mitigation and transformation to green energy with two priorities:

- ensuring universal access to sufficient amounts of clean, appropriate and affordable energy.
- helping African countries leapfrog to renewable energy systems that support their low-carbon development strategies while enhancing economic and energy security.

Different African countries, multilateral institutions, and donors are represented on the Board. AREI is set to add at least 300 GW of renewable energy (i.e. more than doubling current energy generation on the continent) by 2030, with an initial 10 GW by 2020 (a doubling of the current rate of expansion).

AREI is currently the only Africa-owned and Africa-led energy initiative, which makes it a promising opportunity for regional energy cooperation on the continent (mitigation focus). Its major strength seems to be the participation and inputs from African governments and the African Union.

One weakness of AREI is its lack of track record as a finance channel, which makes it hard to gauge its performance. The team received a relatively sceptical assessment from an expert specialised in renewable energy in Africa, as well as from German Watch. Although an Independent Delivery Unit (IDU) became operational in mid-2018, implementation has been delayed considerably compared with the 2020 target of adding at least 10 GW of renewable energy generation capacity.

For AREI to be an effective channel to accelerate progress on electricity access and scale up the implementation of renewable energy in Africa, participation and transparency issues have to be resolved. At the regional consultations in 2018 and early 2019, many countries were not represented, and no participation of stakeholders or civil society was facilitated, except for East Africa. Current slow and non-transparent project implementation may encourage donors to look for other cooperation possibilities on the African continent.

Norway is currently *not* recommended to support the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI). Although it has the advantage of being the only Africa-owned and Africa-led energy initiative today, any support should be conditional on a longer track record. Accordingly, its performance should be followed closely by Norfund officials specialised in renewable energy investments.

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Funds associated with the World Bank

The World Banks Climate Investment Funds (CIF)

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisations, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Climate Investment Funds (CIF)** under the World Bank
When the organisation was established	The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) were founded in 2008 to deliver concessional funding through the multilateral development banks (MDBs) to support climate objectives.
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	"CIF's goal is to support transformational change toward low-carbon, climate-resilient development in the areas of mitigation, resilience, and forests." (ITAD, 2019a). "It does this through four programs: The Clean Technology Fund (CTF), the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), the Forest Investment Program (FIP), and the Scaling Up Renewable Energy in Low-Income Countries Program (SREP)" (ITAD, 2019b). "Mobilization of private investments in climate activities (mitigation and adaptation) is a core objective of the CIF." (Danida, 2012).
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	The governing board of CIF have the following members in CTF (Clean Technology Fund) and SCF (Strategic Climate Fund): CFT: 16-members of the trust fund committee, where 8 are from developed countries and 8 from developing countries. SCF: 16-members of the trust fund committee, where 8 are from developed countries and 8 from developing countries. 12-member subcommittees for Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP), and Forest Investment Program (FIP) each: 6 from developed countries and 6 from developing countries. (WRI, 2017) "Although operating outside the guidance of the UNFCCC, the CIF has achieved legitimacy in design through its balanced and inclusive governance. (…) but at a cost in efficiency" (ICF International, 2014a). "The CIF's good disclosure practices and reliance on the MDBs' existing accountability mechanisms strongly support Program legitimacy." (ICF International, 2014b). "The CIFs devolve much of the project administration and review functions to the MDBs, allowing them to operate with a small administrative unit of 24 full-time staff." (WRI, 2017).
Annual budget (in total	Record of climate finance commitments for the CIF SCF: USD 316 million

and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	(2014), USD 289 million (2015), USD 141 million (2016), USD 330 million (2017). See chapter 4. Record of climate finance commitments for the CIF CTF: USD 906 million (2014), USD 519 million (2015) , USD 459 million (2016), USD 253 million (2017).
Size of portfolio (historically)	Since the CIF was established in 2008, 14 donor countries have contributed over $8 billion in support of scaling up mitigation and adaptation action in developing and middle-income countries. These precious public resources are held in trust by the World Bank, and they are disbursed as grants, highly concessional loans, and risk mitigation instruments to recipient countries through multilateral development banks. "Under these programs [CTF, PPCR, FIP, SREP], 300 projects across 72 countries have been supported" (ITAD, 2019b). "US$8 billion contributed since 2008" (ITAD, 2019b).
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	"14 [multilateral development bank] donors now contributing" (DFID, 2016b). UK, France and Denmark are CIF contributors. It has not been possible to find Norway contributions in Norads statistical portal.
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	Voluntary contributions.
Management ability to handle large contributions	"The CIFs have allocated most of their funding" (WRI, 2017).
Main recipients	Less than 20 % of the support goes to LDC's, SIDS and African countries. (WRI, 2017)
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	82% for mitigation and 18% for adaptation in 2018 (see Chapter 4).
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	"Significant uncertainty surrounds whether a replenishment will take place given the CIFs' sunset clause, and if so, at what scale and from which contributors. " (WRI, 2017)
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	"The CIFs are providing valuable lessons on how to integrate low carbon, resilient approaches into sustainable development, including for the new Green Climate Fund." (DFID, 2016b). "CIFs should begin the process of sunsetting, assuming the GCF scales up and is able to fill key roles played by these funds" (WRI, 2017). "The CIF's funding situation has also changed; the CTF has closed its project pipeline, and the FIP and SREP are facing a shortfall in available resources, while PPCR has limited available resources remaining" (ICF International, 2018a).

	”The CIFs were established with a clause stating that they “will take necessary steps to conclude [their] operations once a new financial architecture is effective.” (WRI, 2017) “In theory, the GCF could absorb some of the ongoing CIF portfolio of work, which would directly address the concern that the CIFs operate outside the guidance of the international community through the UNFCCC. The GCF has already accredited all the CIF implementing partners (MDBs), has started looking at programmatic approaches, supports country programming, and can provide the same spectrum of financial instruments and readiness support. If the CIFs do sunset, the GCF would need to ensure that it carries forward the CIFs' programmatic approach to financing.” (WRI, 2017) “If the CIFs do not sunset, they should explore ways to continue with much reduced funding from contributors, who are directing more of their resources to the GCF.” (WRI, 2017) ”The CIFs could also place more emphasis on using their knowledge of low-emissions and climate-resilient projects to help MDBs move away from financing high-emission and maladaptive investments” (WRI, 2017).
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	“CIFs should begin the process of sunsetting, assuming the GCF scales up and is able to fill key roles played by these funds” (WRI, 2017). “In the 15 programs that were evaluated in greater depth (…) are not only thematically relevant (e.g., low-carbon, adaptation, sustainable forests) but also strategically relevant (e.g., aligned with core political priorities and implemented in such a way as to deliver maximum impact. This was a finding supported by a wider portfolio review of investment plans)” (ITAD, 2019b).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and	“CIF has contributed to shifting development trajectories in its target countries. Over the ten years of CIF's operation, there have been significant changes in the development dynamics associated with climate change. CIF's programs have, in many cases, made a significant contribution to this dynamic” (ITAD, 2019b). “In terms of transformational outcomes, all the programs evaluated in greater detail demonstrated signals of change across the dimensions” (ITAD, 2019b).

quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"Across the CIF portfolio there are examples of investments (…) helping to unlock the potential of the private sector at all scales of activity." (Bird, Cao, & Quevedo, 2019). "Of the four programs under CIF, the CTF portfolio is the most advanced in terms of implementation, with 70 percent of projects having been approved between three and nine years ago" (ITAD, 2019b). "The evidence points to the programmatic approach being generally less of a specific driver for crowding in co-financing or parallel financing than anticipated" (ICF International, 2018b). "In practice, in the investment planning phase, the use of the programmatic approach had significant advantages over a project-by-project approach that contributed to important outcomes" (ICF International, 2018b). "The Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP), overprogram by 30 percent of pledged resources on the understanding that some projects will not reach fruition (CIFs 2015a)." (WRI, 2017).
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	The CIFs could also strengthen their stakeholder engagement, and improve efficiency of delivery (which has proven slower in some programmes than others)." (DFID, 2016b). "The CTF benefits from economies of scale to keep administrative costs to 1 percent of capitalization. However, because it supports larger and fewer projects, its per-project administrative costs are mid-range, at around $460,000. The SCF, which funds more management-intensive adaptation, forestry, and small-scale renewable projects, has a higher administrative budget as a proportion of its capitalization and the second-highest administrative costs per project approved." (WRI, 2017)
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"Scaling and sustainability more likely to be present in CTF, and SREP, PPCR, and FIP more likely to provide evidence of systemic change" (ITAD, 2019b).
f. Environmental and	"CIF has demonstrated an increasing attention to gender over its ten years of

social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	operation."(ITAD, 2019b). CIF has a Gender Action Plan from 2014 and a Gender Policy from 2018 (ITAD, 2019b).
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	"The CIF design strategy of investing large sums has enabled it to engage lead national ministries responsible for strategic planning and financial management in partner countries." (Bird et al., 2019). "The CIFs provide a multiyear envelope of programmatic funding for each partner country on the basis of an investment plan that countries must prepare prior to receiving funds. The development of investment plans has helped to improve planning and alignment with national strategies. However, it has been less successful at improving interagency coordination. Further, while the CIFs also call for stakeholder engagement, broader public ownership is sometimes lacking, which has led to challenges in implementation (ICF International 2014). In response to issues raised during the CIFs' independent evaluation, there has been some progress in local stakeholder engagement and implementation of the CIF Gender Action Plan." (WRI, 2017)
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"Consistent with its pilot nature, the CIF have been able to evolve at the organizational level in response to learning and experiences." (ICF International, 2014b). "At the project and investment plan level, the emphasis on learning has not been sufficiently institutionalized" (ICF International, 2014b).

Key information and conclusions

The Climate Investment Funds (CIF) was founded in 2008 to deliver concessional loans through the multilateral development banks (MDBs) in support of climate objectives. CIF focuses on low-carbon, climate-resilient development in the areas of mitigation, resilience, and forests.

CIF encompasses the CTF (Clean Technology Fund) and SCF (Strategic Climate Fund), which share a governing body, the 16-member Trust Fund Committee, of whom 8 are from developed countries and 8 from developing countries. There is also a12-member Subcommittee for the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP), and Forest Investment Program (FIP).

CIF is administered by the World Bank Group and reliant on MDBs' procedures. Under the programmes, 300 projects across 72 countries have been supported (CTF, Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) and Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program SREP).

The assessment of CIF is mainly based on ITADs report "Evaluation of Transformational Change in the Climate Investment Funds" from 2019, and the report by WRI "The Future of the Funds - Exploring the Architecture of Multilateral Climate Finance" from 2017.

One of CIF's strengths is its close collaboration with the private sector. Also CIF present in developing countries, but there has been some debate whether private sector investments and contributions based on loans are helping vulnerable communities in the longer run, or if these financial delivery mechanisms instead reduce local resilience and sustainability.

As can be seen in Chapter 4, the climate finance commitments under the CIF SCF was: USD 316 million (2014), USD 289 million (2015), USD 141 million (2016), USD 330 million (2017).

The record of climate finance commitments for the CIF CTF: USD 906 million (2014), USD 519 million (2015), USD 459 million (2016), USD 253 million (2017).

Norway's like-minded countries, such as the UK, France, Denmark etc. are CIF contributors. Norway has not contributed (check?).

It remains wholly unclear whether replenishment will take place, as the CIFs' sunset clause makes its overall lifespan uncertain. CIF should begin the process of sunsetting, assuming that the GCF scales up and is able to fill key roles currently played by these funds, according to the WRI.

82% was spent on mitigation and 18% on adaptation in 2018 (see Chapter 4). Less than 20% of support goes to LDCs, SIDS and African countries. These figures are at odds with the course that the team suggests Norway should chart in terms of increased support for adaption in LDCs and SIDS.

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The World Banks Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP)

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisations, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Scaling up Renewable Energy Program (SREP)** handled by the World Bank. (SREP) is a funding window of the CIF channeled through five multilateral development banks (MDBs), SREP financing supports scaled-up deployment of renewable energy solutions to increase energy access and economic opportunities. (CIF, 2019)
When the organisation was established	2009
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	SREP is "designed to demonstrate the economic, social and environmental viability of low-carbon development pathways in the energy sector by creating new economic opportunities and increasing energy access through the use of renewable energy" (ICF International, 2014).
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	"Sub- Committee contains six members each from donor and recipient countries" (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014). "Equal representation of developed and developing countries on the governing Sub-Committee" (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014). "Observers representing civil society, indigenous peoples and the private sector also make inputs and engage in design" (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014). "Key documents and minutes are made publicly available, although information on private sector investments remains confidential." (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014).
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	Cumulative co-financing in 2014 was 92.2 Mio US $., Actual co-financing is 397.64 Mio US $ (CIF, 2019) Approval as of 11/2018; 744.54 Mio. US $.(CFU, 2019)
Size of portfolio (historically)	Actual cumulative co-financing as of 2019 is 489.86 Mio US $, furthermore SREP have improved energy access to 7.395 people (CIF, 2019)
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	Germany (3,464 million US $), United Kingdom (5,181.22 Mio. US $), Sweden (1,116.1 million US $) and Norway (2,919.11 million US $) (cumulative since 2003) (CFU, 2019). Furthermore, (SREP) is a funding window of the CIF channelled through five multilateral development banks (MDBs), SREP financing supports scaled-up

	deployment of renewable energy solutions to increase energy access and economic opportunities. (CIF, 2019)
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	Cofinancing (WRI, 2017)
Overall approval and disbursement time	“Disbursement is significantly delayed” (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014).
Management ability to handle large contributions	
Main recipients countries	“Collectively, the CTF, PPCR, FIP, and SREP are working with 48 recipient countries” (ICF International, 2014). Less than 20 % of the support goes to LDC’s, SIDS and African countries. (WRI, 2017)
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	Mitigation (CIF, 2019) “a portfolio with about 61 percent of funds focused on grid-tied renewable energy” (ICF International, 2014). Mitigation only (WRI, 2017)
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	SREP is under the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs. Therefore it is expected that SREP vision is aligned with the Paris Agreement; “We, the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), are acting on our previous commitments made at COP 21 – including to support to the Five Voluntary Principles for Mainstreaming Climate Action within Financial institutions – and at the One Planet Summit. In particular, in December 2017, together with the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), we announced our vision to align financial flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement.” (MDBs, 2018) MDB’s are; “The African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank Group, the Islamic Development Bank, the New Development Bank, and the World Bank Group (IFC, MIGA, World Bank).” (MDBs, 2018)
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	Some of SREP’s strengths are; its ability to be relevant: “The investment plan development process has provided an opportunity for national leadership and engagement with relevant institutions and stakeholders” (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014). Furthermore; “SREP off-grid projects have focused largely on addressing energy needs in rural and remote areas with no power infrastructure, where small-scale, distributed renewable energy technology is appropriate. A strong focus on mini-grid systems is also consistent with SREP’s focus on productive use” (ICF International, 2014).

	"SREP is actively expanding through new pledges and soliciting additional pilot countries " (ICF International, 2014). "SREP investment plans present potential for substantial gains for renewable energy supply" (ICF International, 2014). Some of the weaknesses are; the low impact; "SREP resources are modest when compared to the scale of the energy issues in many of the pilot countries" (ICF International, 2014). When it comes to alignment and ownership, there was the following comments "It is a central intention in the SREP's design that the fund be country-led and build on national policies. The commitment of recipient governments to mainstream renewable energy development in their energy plans was therefore a major factor in the pilot country selection process." (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014). At the same time; "Concerns have been raised in some cases over the extent to which resulting investment plans reflect MDB priorities over those of governments" (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014).
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"The investment plan development process has provided an opportunity for national leadership and engagement with relevant institutions and stakeholders" (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable	"SREP resources are modest when compared to the scale of the energy issues in many of the pilot countries" (ICF International, 2014). "The SREP is not particularly innovative in terms of the technologies supported" (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014).

communities.	
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"Only three SREP projects had MDB approval at the time of the evaluation [2014], and even the 28 approved projects involve only $340 million" (ICF International, 2014). "All but one SREP country has met SREP's indicative timeline [for investment plan preparation](up to 15 months)" (ICF International, 2014).
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"SREP operational documents also lack guidance on how to manage trade-offs between direct climate benefit and broader development benefit priorities" (ICF International, 2014).
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"None of SREP's joint mission reports or investment plans explicitly reported consultation with women's groups" (ICF International, 2014). "The SREP relies on MDBs safeguard policies to manage social and environmental risks; these are relevant given the portfolio includes some large scale centralised investments" (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014).
g. Alignment and	"It is a central intention in the SREP's design that the fund be country-led and

ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	build on national policies. The commitment of recipient governments to mainstream renewable energy development in their energy plans was therefore a major factor in the pilot country selection process." (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014). "Concerns have been raised in some cases over the extent to which resulting investment plans reflect MDB priorities over those of governments" (Barnard & Nakhooda, 2014).
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"The recent process for selecting new pilot countries under the SREP has further built upon this learning with refined selection criteria and a more robust expression of interest requirement from the countries." (ICF International, 2014). "For SREP and CTF, development benefits are expected to be described in project documentation at the project output, outcome, and impact levels, so that ex-post evaluations can assess achievements." (ICF International, 2014).

Key Information and Conclusions

Scaling up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) was established in 2009 and is handled by the World Bank. SREP is a funding window of the CIF channelled through five multilateral development banks (MDBs): AfDB, ADB, European Bank, IDB and WBG. There is equal representation of developed and developing countries on the governing Sub-Committee.

Purpose: to finance scaled-up deployment of renewable energy solutions in order to increase energy access and economic opportunities.

SREP has approved grants of USD 744 million for the year 2018, which is channelled through five multilateral development banks (MDBs). The main donors are Germany (USD 3.4 million), United Kingdom (USD 5.1 million), Norway (USD 2.9 million) and Sweden (USD 1.1 million). (These figures are cumulative since 2003 according to CFU, 2019).

SREP has improved energy access for 7,395 people, according to its website. One of SREP's strengths is its high relevance to Norwegian priorities. The process of developing investment plans provides opportunities for national leadership and engagement with relevant institutions and stakeholders. Furthermore, the SREP's off-grid projects have focused on addressing energy needs in rural and remote areas with no power infrastructure, where small-scale, distributed renewable energy technology is appropriate. Another advantage is that SREP is expanding by making new commitments and adding pilot countries. SREP's investment plans present potentials for substantial gains for renewable energy supply based on country-led processes and built on national policies.

One weakness is that SREP's resources are modest in view of the scale of the energy issues in many of the pilot countries. At the same time, evaluations have raised some concerns over the extent to which resulting investment plans reflect the priorities of MDBs over those of governments. This is discussed in the IFC international report "Independent Evaluation of the Climate Investment Funds" from 2014.

Norway could consider continuing the support for the Scaling up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) handled by the World Bank (through CIF). However, Norwegian ministries should first conduct and up-to-date analysis of this funding channel.

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The World Banks Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP)

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP)**
When the organisation was established	1983
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	The Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) works to accelerate the energy transition required to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG7) to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. Energy access: ESMAP is leading a major Energy Access effort by the World Bank focused on closing financing gaps and accelerating electrification rates through comprehensive grid and off-grid strategies, including some of the largest electrification investment programs, such as in Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar, and Nigeria. Energy efficiency: Several ESMAP activities are helping cities improve services, enhance competitiveness, save costs, and reduce environmental impacts through: Renewable energy: ESMAP's work on renewable energy tackles the challenge from multiple angles. It helps countries to understand their resource potential, to de-risk geothermal resource validation and unlock financing for projects, to remove barriers to the integration of renewables in the grid, and to scale-up solar power, crowding in private sector financing. Energy subsidy reform: ESMAP's $20 million Energy Subsidy Reform Technical Assistance Facility (ESRAF) was set up in 2013 to help countries remove fossil fuel subsidies while protecting the poor. Since 2014, the facility has allocated US$16 million for technical assistance that has supported about US$9.6 billion of World Bank development financing. Knowledge hub: The Knowledge Hub, a joint effort of ESMAP and the World Bank's Energy and Extractives Global practice focuses on producing knowledge and data tools to track progress on the Sustainable Development Goal on Energy (SDG7). Four specific, but complementary initiatives are being implemented under the Knowledge Hub: The SDG7 Tracking is a comprehensive tool to track the energy pillars on access, renewables and efficiency.

	Governance market and planning: In FY2017, ESMAP's portfolio informed almost $2.9 billion in World Bank development financing focusing on: providing advice on regulatory environment and market structures, supporting power utilities reforms, consulting with governments on power system planning and advising on regional integration of infrastructure. (ESMAP, 2019b)
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	ESMAP is a partnership between the World Bank Group and 18 partners to help low and middle-income countries reduce poverty and boost growth, through environmentally sustainable energy solutions. "The organizations that make up the World Bank Group are owned by the governments of member nations, which have the ultimate decision-making power within the organizations on all matters, including policy, financial or membership issues." (World Bank, 2019a) "The voting power of each Member country is based on the number of shares it holds. Shares are allocated differently in each organization, resulting in different voting powers." (World Bank, 2019) "ESMAP is governed by a Consultative Group (CG) comprising representatives from contributing donors, and chaired by the Senior Director of the World Bank's Energy and Extractives Global Practice. The CG meets annually to review ESMAP's strategic direction, achievements, use of resources and funding requirements." (ESMAP, 2019a) "ESMAP's organizational structure is not widely understood and could be more clearly communicated" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). "The consistency of financial reporting could be improved to further support accountability" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	The annual climate finance commitments were 34 mio. US $ in 2016 and 35 mio. US $ in 2017.
Size of portfolio (historically)	"ESMAP has supported more than 800 energy-sector activities in more than 100 countries" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). "In its previous five-year business plan (2008-2013), more than US$80 million was disbursed" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). "The current three-year business plan (2014-2016) proposes a budget of US$137 million" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). Cumulative contributions to ESMAP have been 173,672.16 thousand US $ from 2010-2016.
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	Main donors in 2016: Netherlands (12,699.23 thousand US $), Sweden (4,061.86 thousand US $) and United Kingdom (3,733.99 thousand US $). Norway have cumulative contributed with 15,884.20 thousand US $ from 2010-2016 and paid in 2016 3,996.76 thousand US $. (ESMAP, 2019b)

Core funding versus voluntary contributions	Voluntary contributions from donors.
Overall approval and disbursement time	"The consistency of financial reporting could be improved to further support accountability; the use of different budget categories across reports made it difficult to track allocations, commitments, and disbursements over the review period." (IFC, 2016)
Management ability to handle large contributions	"The World Bank's commitments and disbursements were US$59.77 billion and US$44.58 billion respectively in 2015." (MOPAN, 2017) The World Bank, which ESMAP is under have a high ability to handle large contributions.
Main recipients	"low- and middle-income countries (and communities therein)" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	Manly mitigation projects (and policies)
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	"ESMAP and ASTAE are also relevant to development and climate agendas, including the achievement of the SDGs for 2030 and the Paris Agreement" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). IFC's vision is to be aligned with the Paris Agreement; "We, the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), are acting on our previous commitments made at COP 21 – including to support to the Five Voluntary Principles for Mainstreaming Climate Action within Financial institutions – and at the One Planet Summit. In particular, in December 2017, together with the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), we announced our vision to align financial flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement." (MDBs, 2018) MDB's are; "The African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank Group, the Islamic Development Bank, the New Development Bank, and the World Bank Group (IFC, MIGA, World Bank)." (MDBs, 2018)
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	The MOPAN report "MOPAN 2015-16 Assessments, The World Bank - Institutional Assessment Report" only asses the World Bank. By looking at it's evaluations the following strengths and weaknesses of the institution is found. The top strengths of the world bank is the following: "Unparalleled global reach and financial resources, as one of the world's most influential international development bodies it is often developing countries' development partner of choice; its flagship knowledge products often drive global and national agendas. Strong country-level engagement, and a demand-driven model strengthened by new tools that improve country analysis and intervention targeting.

	Ability to anticipate and adjust to a changing global environment. Resulting from deep analytical capability, this enables the Bank to deploy financial resources and institutional expertise to maximum effect." (MOPAN, 2017) Furthermore, there was found room for improvements on the following areas in the World Bank: "Further developing its strategic and operational approach so it is more effective in complex situations characterised by fragility, conflict and violence. Improving knowledge management to ensure the Bank delivers an appropriate balance between investing in knowledge generation and financing development outcomes; a more strategic approach is needed to address this longstanding challenge. This also includes the need to continue investing in the creation of a learning culture within the organisation, so that staff are better placed to learn from operational performance to optimise future delivery. Further strengthening results and performance reporting remains essential. While it is clear that the Bank has made commendable efforts in enhancing its results focus, M&E frameworks at the project and country level continue to need strengthening, as these provide the foundation of wider reflection and reporting. There is also a need to strengthen reporting on results in gender and climate change, and hence improve accountability for these cross-cutting issues." (MOPAN, 2017) When looking at ESMAP specifically the strengths and weaknesses are the following. Some of the EXMAPs strengths is that the operational link to "World Bank investment are strong, with both programs influencing several billion dollars of financing" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). "At the country level, interviews and fieldwork suggest that ESMAP and ASTAE activities are highly relevant to the needs and priorities of their client countries." (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). Furthermore there have been identified comparative advantages, which includes "cross-fertilization of knowledge with operations." (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). "ESMAP's businesses lines and program priorities are aligned with its three objectives enhance development financing; influence policy and strategy and increase client capacity; and deepen knowledge and generate innovative solutions." (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). Furthermore, ESMAP is well-governed. "The Consultative Group (CG) is an effective governing body that is fulfilling its key functions, including providing strategic direction, management oversight, and commissioning evaluations." (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). "ESMAP's revised M&E framework is a good practice example for activity- and program-level results reporting among World Bank-administered multi-donor trust funds. The framework aligns objectives with outcomes, includes measurable indicators, and is supported by operational guidance and staff."

	(ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). "ESMAP and ASTAE programs reflect a broad portfolio of activities, which have been largely effective in achieving development objectives" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). Besides from the positive assets of ESMAP, it also have it's challenges. One of the main issues is that "ESMAP's organizational structure is not widely understood and could be more clearly communicated." (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). "To meet current and future demand, evidence suggests that resource levels will need to increase. The historic growth in ESMAP and ASTAE funding allocations and implemented activities mirrors the World Bank's increasing energy sector financing to Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and Energy. (…) Significantly more investments in these areas will be required if SDG goals are to be met. Consequently, the role and resource requirements for ESMAP and ASTAE to support these developments will likely increase." (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"At the program level, ESMAP and ASTAE's objectives and programs remain highly relevant to global and regional challenges in the energy sector" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or	ESMAP is "At the center of global efforts to reach SDG7 and climate targets" (World Bank Group, 2018). "ESMAP and ASTAE disbursement has increased to all regions; however, program impacts may not always be immediately visible" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).

contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"ESMAP and ASTAE programs reflect a broad portfolio of activities, which have been largely effective in achieving development objectives" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). "The evaluation found no obvious examples of inefficiencies, nor any instances of perceived duplication of effort. That said, interviews and the quantitative assessment did suggest some inconsistency in resource allocation for similar activities, possibly based partly on funding availability" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	"In the face of significant program growth, ESMAP has not only maintained a lean administrative budget, but reduced it further" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	"Evidence suggests that 80% of planned outcomes have a good potential to achieve their targets" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016). "Overall, ESMAP and ASTAE activities play an important role in incrementally improving the existing country situation, whether directly through tangible outcomes, or indirectly by opening the door for other interventions to support longer term impacts" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"There has been a visible increase in gender and social inclusion in ESMAP" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).
g. Alignment and	"ESMAP and ASTAE activities are highly relevant to the needs and priorities

ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	of their client countries" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"ESMAP's revised M&E framework is a good practice example for activity- and program-level results reporting among World Bank-administered multi-donor trust funds" (ICF Consulting Ltd, 2016).

Key information

ESMAP was established in 1983 under the World Bank in response to the global energy crisis of the late 1970s and its impact on the economies of oil-importing developing countries.

Purpose: ESMAP is a partnership between the World Bank Group and 18 partners to help low- and middle-income countries reduce poverty and boost growth through environmentally sustainable energy solutions. ESMAP's analytical and advisory services are fully integrated into the WBG's country financing and policy dialogue in the energy sector.

ESMAP is governed by a Consultative Group comprising representatives from contributing donors and chaired by the Senior Director of the World Bank's Energy and Extractives Global Practice.

Climate finance commitments totalled USD 34 million in 2016 and USD 35 million in 2017 (see Chapter 4). The main donors to ESMAP in 2016 were: Netherlands (USD 12.7 million), Sweden (USD 4.0 million), United Kingdom (USD 3.7 million). Denmark contributed DKK 45 million for 2017-2018. Norway's contributed a total of USD 15.8 million from 2010-2016 and also paid USD 30,000 in 2018.[1]

Norway could see it as an advantage that like-minded countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, are also supporting ESMAP. A key justification for Denmark's support is ESMAPs capacity for providing qualified advice to developing countries (e.g. ministries of finance), aimed at strengthening policy frameworks and enabling politically sensitive reforms of energy pricing and subsidies. The ESMAP work plan 2017-2020 is organized around three thematic areas, corresponding to the three SDG7 targets on *energy access*, *renewable energy*, and *energy efficiency*. Three cross-cutting areas of *energy markets, governance and planning*, *energy subsidy reform* and *energy knowledge tools* have been identified to tackle broader sectoral issues.

The assessment of ESMAP is based on ICF Consulting Ltd's report "*External Evaluation of ESMAP and ASTAE*" from 2016. It seems that ESMAP needs more resources to meet future demands and that its

[1] Data for 2018 found in https://norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/access-to-microdata/

operation is closely linked to the World Bank. Furthermore, it is a highly effective and efficient institution, which supports interesting subsidy programmes and exerts a positive influence on countries' financial policies.

Norway could consider increasing its support for ESMAP, which is providing qualified advice and suggestions for policy reforms in the fields of energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency in pursuit of SDG7 targets and attracting more private investments. Backing from the World Bank enables access to ministries of finance in developing countries.

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The World Banks Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) / the Readiness Fund

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility**
When the organisation was established	2008.
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is a global partnership of governments, businesses, civil society, and indigenous people's organizations focused on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, forest carbon stock conservation, the sustainable management of forests, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries, activities commonly referred to as REDD+. The FCPF supports REDD+ efforts through two separate but complementary funds. 1) **The FCPF Readiness Fund** helps countries set up the building blocks to implement REDD+. This includes designing national REDD+ strategies, developing reference emission levels, designing measurement, reporting, and verification systems and setting up national REDD+ management arrangements, including proper environmental and social safeguards. 2) **The FCPF Carbon Fund** pilots results-based payments to countries that have advanced through REDD+ readiness and implementation and have achieved verifiable emission reductions in their forest and broader land-use sectors. Current funding: $900 million.
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	For specific information about the governance of the World Bank Group, see the assessment of IDA. "The FCPF's Participants Committee and Participants Assembly are at the core of its governance structure. The Participants Committee is the main decision-making body of the FCPF, and meets twice a year to review submissions and select new participant countries, as well as approve funding allocations, rules of procedure, budgets and new methodologies. The Participants Assembly meets annually to elect the Participants Committee and provide general guidance. These governing bodies comprise representative from 47 developing countries (18 in Africa, 18 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 11 in Asia-Pacific), 17 donors participants, and active observers from northern and southern indigenous peoples, civil society and women's organizations, as well as several international delivery partners. The World Bank is the trustee of the FCPF's Readiness Fund and Carbon Fund and provides secretariat services through a Facility Management Team. The Facility Management Team administers the Funds and makes proposals to the FCPF Participants Committee and provides country advisory services and REDD+ methodological support." (FCPF, 2019)

	In the FCPF Participants Committee there is; 14 REDD countries participants and 9 financial contributors. (FCPF, 2019) For the World Bank in general; "There is also a need to strengthen reporting on results in gender and climate change, and hence improve accountability for these cross-cutting issues." (MOPAN, 2017)
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	The annual climate finance commitments were 5 Mio. US $ in 2016 and 7 mio. US $ in 2017. The FCPF Readiness Fund**:** Current funding: 400 Mio. US $. The FCPF Carbon Fund**:** Current funding: 900 Mio. US $.
Size of portfolio (historically)	FCPF now works with 47 developing countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean**,** along with 17 donors. FCPF currently have 1.3 billion US $ in contributions & commitments.
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	Main donors to FCPF Readiness Fund are Germany (324.46 million US $), United Kingdom (188.75 million US $), (all numbers are cumulative since 2003) (CFU, 2019). Norway have donated (301.17 million US $) to FCPF Readiness Fund (cumulative since 2003) (CFU, 2019).
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	Voluntary contributions from donors.
Overall approval and disbursement time	"The FCPF encountered challenges in disbursing funds at the Country level and disbursement rates for REDD Readiness implementation was significantly lower than that which was initially expected. Common internal factors identified as affecting the disbursement pace of the Readiness Fund were related to long approval processes (such as transfer agreements, grant agreements). Technical review processes were also long, however there is general agreement of the added technical value of the reviews." (Indufur, 2016)
Management ability to handle large contributions	"The World Bank's commitments and disbursements were US$59.77 billion and US$44.58 billion respectively in 2015." (MOPAN, 2017) The contributions and commitments under FCPF is $1.3 US $ billion in total.
Main recipients' countries	Main recipients of FCPF readiness fund are Indonesia (17.20 mio. US $), DR Congo (17.59 mio. US $), Indonesia (17.20 mio. US $) and Ghana (17.19 mio US $) (cumulative since 2003) (CFU, 2019).
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	Both adaptation and mitigation
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	IFC's vision is to be aligned with the Paris Agreement; "We, the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), are acting on our previous commitments made at COP 21 – including to support to the Five Voluntary Principles for Mainstreaming Climate Action within Financial institutions – and at the One Planet Summit. In particular, in December 2017, together with the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), we announced our vision to align financial flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement." (MDBs, 2018)

	MDB's are; "The African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank Group, the Islamic Development Bank, the New Development Bank, and the World Bank Group (IFC, MIGA, World Bank)." (MDBs, 2018)
Main findings of evaluations/ previous critique	The MOPAN report "MOPAN 2015-16 Assessments, The World Bank - Institutional Assessment Report" only asses the World Bank. By looking at it's evaluations the following strengths and weaknesses of the institution is found. The top strengths of the world bank are the following: "Unparalleled global reach and financial resources, as one of the world's most influential international development bodies it is often developing countries' development partner of choice; its flagship knowledge products often drive global and national agendas. Strong country-level engagement, and a demand-driven model strengthened by new tools that improve country analysis and intervention targeting. Ability to anticipate and adjust to a changing global environment. Resulting from deep analytical capability, this enables the Bank to deploy financial resources and institutional expertise to maximum effect." (MOPAN, 2017) Furthermore, there was found room for improvements on the following areas in the World Bank: "Further developing its strategic and operational approach so it is more effective in complex situations characterised by fragility, conflict and violence. Improving knowledge management to ensure the Bank delivers an appropriate balance between investing in knowledge generation and financing development outcomes; a more strategic approach is needed to address this longstanding challenge. This also includes the need to continue investing in the creation of a learning culture within the organisation, so that staff are better placed to learn from operational performance to optimise future delivery. Further strengthening results and performance reporting remains essential. While it is clear that the Bank has made commendable efforts in enhancing its results focus, M&E frameworks at the project and country level continue to need strengthening, as these provide the foundation of wider reflection and reporting. There is also a need to strengthen reporting on results in gender and climate change, and hence improve accountability for these cross-cutting issues." (MOPAN, 2017) Some of the strengths are, that the efficiency of FCPFs programmes have been improved; "Tailored technical assistance to the REDD Countries improved the efficiency of the program leading to a supply of ER-PINs presented to the Carbon Fund that exceeded its target." (Indufor, 2016) Furthermore FCPF's work is very relevant; "The Bank (…) has also introduced new business processes and tools to build better knowledge of context and thus ensure relevance to clients." (MOPAN, 2017)

	Some of the weaknesses of FCPF is the low effectiveness is the following; ”The FCPF has provided extensive support in preparing countries to undertake REDD Readiness planning and its initial implementation. (…)The FCPF demonstrated limited effectiveness in supporting countries to undertake the advanced stages of REDD Readiness". (Indufor, 2016) Additionally FCPF experienced a decline in impact of the work; ”The FCPF reached a stage where the existing monitoring system does not fully correspond to the current situation in program implementation and the global context. The fact that the FCPF has only achieved approximately half of its expected outcomes has weakened the Results Chain.” (Indufur, 2016)
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	“The Bank has responded with structural reforms that aim to strengthen its generation and management of knowledge, and ensure that this better underpins the Bank’s operations and its global leadership in different areas. It has also introduced new business processes and tools to build better knowledge of context and thus ensure relevance to clients..” (MOPAN, 2017) “The Bank (…) has also introduced new business processes and tools to build better knowledge of context and thus ensure relevance to clients.” (MOPAN, 2017) “The FCPF continued to add value to REDD Countries through its common readiness framework and structured approach to REDD Readiness. (…) Financial Contributors had common strategic priorities to which the FCPF had responded appropriately” (Indufor, 2016)
b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate	”The FCPF reached a stage where the existing monitoring system does not fully correspond to the current situation in program implementation and the global context. The fact that the FCPF has only achieved approximately half of its expected outcomes has weakened the Results Chain.” (Indufur, 2016)

adaptation in vulnerable communities.	
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	”Overall, the Bank's systems, planning and operations are fit for purpose and enable the effective delivery of its mandate, with some room for improvement in specific areas. The Bank has a very strong internal control and accountability architecture, and practices a systematic and rigorous approach to risk management. A variety of units, processes and tools support risk management and control throughout the Bank. These are sometimes considered too heavy and bureaucratic, and cause delays in implementation, but the trade-off benefits are the Bank's consistent AAA rating and the trust of its member countries and partners, which it earns partly due to the rigorous control environment.” (MOPAN, 2017) ”The FCPF has provided extensive support in preparing countries to undertake REDD Readiness planning and its initial implementation. (…)The FCPF demonstrated limited effectiveness in supporting countries to undertake the advanced stages of REDD Readiness". (Indufor, 2016)
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	”The Bank is aware of its own strengths and continuously assesses opportunities and challenges. Its current reforms demonstrate how it strives to ensure the best application of its assets and leveraging of its resources, building on its own analysis as well as external input. (…) The Bank clearly articulates the importance of knowledge, and the centrality of the complimentary deployment of knowledge and financial resources for its business model. However it considered that insufficient attention had been paid to the knowledge dimension and to ensuring that both financing and knowledge are available to clients in sufficient quality and quantity, and in the right combination.” (MOPAN, 2017) “Tailored technical assistance to the REDD Countries improved the efficiency of the program leading to a supply of ER-PINs presented to the Carbon Fund that exceeded its target.” (Indufor, 2016)
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	”The Bank's largely demand-driven business model implies a degree of built-in relevance to national priorities, enhanced through the Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCDs). (…) The SCDs also constitute the backbone of consultations to focus the joint efforts towards achieving the global goals of ending absolute poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner. The process of preparing the SCDs in itself helps ensure relevance in that inputs and feedback from country partners and citizens are expected to inform SCD's assessment of a country's development constraints and opportunities. ” (MOPAN, 2017) “There continues to be a disconnect between UNFCCC and FCPF safeguard requirements.” (Indufor, 2016)
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights,	“The Bank has an extremely robust oversight and accountability architecture, comprising a number of dedicated units that oversee financial integrity, compliance with social and environmental safeguards, risk, governance and

gender, minorities)	internal processes, and contribution to development results. ” (MOPAN, 2017)
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	”The Bank’s strategy already notes that the traditional classification of countries into income categories is increasingly insufficient to capture the differentiated needs of clients. The Bank’s new approach to country engagement, which remains the primary focus of its efforts, aims to maintain its operational relevance. The Bank’s largely demand-driven business model also ensures a degree of de facto relevance to national priorities. Systematic Country Diagnostics in particular constitute country- specific analytical exercises to identify how the Bank can maximise its contribution to meeting clients’ needs. These also serve as a tool through which binding constraints to the realisation of development objectives are identified so that resources may be directed accordingly.” ” (MOPAN, 2017)
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	The Bank has tools and processes in place for measuring and managing results, signalling a strong corporate commitment to results-based management.” (MOPAN, 2017)

Key information and conclusion

The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) was established in 2008.

Purpose: The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is a global alliance of governments, businesses, civil society, and indigenous peoples focused on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, while promoting forest carbon stock conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries, activities commonly referred to as REDD+.

The FCPF supports REDD+ efforts through two separate but complementary funds: The FCPF Readiness Fund and The FCPF Carbon Fund:

- The FCPF Readiness Fund helps countries set up the building blocks to implement REDD+. Current funding: USD 400 million.
- The FCPF Carbon Fund pilots results-based payments to countries that have advanced in terms of REDD+ readiness and implementation and have achieved verifiable emission reductions in their forest and broader land-use sectors. Current funding: USD 900 million.

The FCPF’s Participants Committee and Participants Assembly are at the core of its governance structure, comprising representatives from 47 developing countries (18 in Africa, 18 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 11 in Asia-Pacific), 17 donor participants and active observers from indigenous peoples and civil society.

The accumulated contributions and commitments under FCPF total USD 1.3 billion. The main donors to the FCPF Readiness Fund are Germany (USD 324 million), Norway (USD 301 million to the Readiness Fund) and United Kingdom (USD 188 million). All figures are cumulative since 2003 (CFU, 2019)

The FCPF has provided extensive and highly relevant support in preparing countries to undertake REDD Readiness planning and initial implementation. However, FCPF demonstrated limited effectiveness in assisting countries in the more advanced stages of REDD Readiness. This assessment of FCPF is mainly based on Indufur’s *“Second Evaluation of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Final Report*” from 2016.

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International Finance Corporation (IFC) under the World Bank Group

This format is intended to gather data about each international organisation, with the potential to be a financial channel for increased Norwegian climate assistance.

Background information regarding the organisation:	
Full name:	**International Finance Corporation (IFC)**
When the organisation was established	IFC was established in 1956, it is a sister organisation to the World Bank and a member of the World Bank Group.
Purpose / objective of organisation (or fund)	IFC work with the private sector in developing countries to create markets that open up opportunities for all. IFC's expertise is in the following areas: Agribusiness and forestry: IFC invests across the agribusiness supply chain—from farm to retail—to help boost production, increase liquidity, improve logistics and distribution, and expand access to credit for small farmers. Financial institutions: IFC works through financial institutions to provide much-needed access to finance for millions of individuals and micro, small, and medium enterprises that we would never be able to reach directly. Funds: IFC works with private equity funds in emerging markets because they can have a significant impact on company growth and job creation. Our work with them bring capital to promising companies and mobilized money for renewable energy, infrastructure, and other projects in some of the world's poorest countries. Health and education: By investing in this critical sector, IFC is contributing to improved access to high quality care for people in developing countries. Infrastructure: IFC helps develop infrastructure projects that can meaningfully improve peoples' lives in emerging markets, with a special emphasis on fast-growing cities where there are critical needs in power, utilities, and transportation. Manufacturing: IFC invests across a diverse range of sectors within a strategy of promoting job creation, productivity enhancement, and environment and social sustainability. Oil, gas and mining: IFC works to support the sustainable development of oil, gas and mining projects in a way that mitigates risk and promotes long-term benefits for local communities. We work with companies, governments, and local people to maximize benefits and minimize risks throughout project life cycles.

	Public-private partnerships: Through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), governments partner with the private sector to deliver a public service in line with strict service criteria. The government establishes the project objectives, while the private sector takes responsibility for meeting them. Telecoms, Media and technology: IFC works to extend the availability of such technologies. We channel investments toward private companies that build modern communications infrastructure and information-technology businesses, and develop climate-friendly technologies. Tourism, retail, and property: IFC focuses on key industries that form the foundation of sustainable growth and that provide affordable goods and services to consumers, create jobs, contribute to government revenue, and stimulate the growth of local small and medium enterprises. (IFC, 2019b)
Governance-structure (owners/responsible, decision making for approval of projects) - Representation of developing countries in decision making processes. Legitimacy - Transparency and accountability - Anti-corruption practices	"IFC is part of the WBG" (DFID, 2016). "The organizations that make up the World Bank Group are owned by the governments of member nations, which have the ultimate decision-making power within the organizations on all matters, including policy, financial or membership issues." (World Bank, 2019a) "The voting power of each Member country is based on the number of shares it holds. Shares are allocated differently in each organization, resulting in different voting powers." (World Bank, 2019) For specific information about the governance of the World Bank Group, see the assessment of IDA. Following article IV section 1 "Structure of the Corporation"; "*The Corporation shall have a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors, a Chairman of the Board of Directors, a President and such other officers and staff to perform such duties as the Corporation may determine*." (IFC, 2019a) Following article IV section 2 "Board of Governors": "*(a) All the powers of the Corporation shall be vested in the Board of Governors.* *(b) Each Governor and Alternate Governor of the Bank appointed by a member of the Bank which is also a member of the Corporation shall ex officio be a Governor or Alternate* Governor*, respectively, of the Corporation…*" (IFC, 2019a) Following article IV section 3 "V*oting*": *"The share votes of each member shall be the number of votes that results from the allocation of one vote for each share of stock held."* (IFC, 2019a) "IFC has 184 member countries, each holding a share of capital" (DFID, 2016). "IFC is strong on risk, fraud and anti-corruption." (DFID, 2016).

	"IFC should improve on transparency" (DFID, 2016).
Annual budget (in total and for climate change) for 2016 and if available, 2017	The annual climate finance commitments were 2.425 mio. US $ in 2016 and 2.964 mio. US $ in 2017. Total climate finance commitments for the IFC were produced using the percentage climate-relevance and commitment values stated in the IFC Annual Report 2017. Total concessional outflow figure taken from IFC Annual Report 2016.
Size of portfolio (historically)	Since 1956, IFC has leveraged $2.6 billion in capital to deliver more than $285 billion in financing for businesses in developing countries.
Main donors (including Norway's contribution)	Main shareholders are amongst others United States 22%, United Kingdom with 5 %, France 5 %, Germany 5 %, Netherlands 2 %. (IFC, 2019c) In comparison, "The UK's contribution to IFC Trust Funds in 2015 totalled £39 million." (DFID, 2016).
Core funding versus voluntary contributions	
Overall approval and disbursement time	
Management ability to handle large contributions	"The World Bank's commitments and disbursements were US$59.77 billion and US$44.58 billion respectively in 2015." (MOPAN, 2017) The World Bank, which IFC is under, have a high ability to handle large contributions. Therefor it is very likely that IFC also have a high ability to manage large contributions.
Main recipients' countries	Country committed portfolio is on the some of the following countries India (11%), Turkey 9%, China 6%, Brazil 5 %. (IFC, 2019c)
Balance of contribution to mitigation, adaptation or mixed (if relevant)	The World Bank's balance between adaptation and mitigation is 50/50.
Climate Policies/strategies in place (including possible targets for leaving finance for fossil energy investments and alignment with PA).	IFC's vision is to be aligned with the Paris Agreement; "We, the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), are acting on our previous commitments made at COP 21 – including to support to the Five Voluntary Principles for Mainstreaming Climate Action within Financial institutions – and at the One Planet Summit. In particular, in December 2017, together with the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), we announced our vision to align financial flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement." (MDBs, 2018) MDB's are; "The African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank Group, the Islamic Development Bank, the New Development Bank, and the World Bank Group (IFC, MIGA, World Bank)." (MDBs, 2018)
Main findings of evaluations/ previous	For specific information about main assessments of the World Bank Group, see the assessment of IDA. The following evaluation focus more specifically on

critique	IFC. The MOPAN report "MOPAN 2015-16 Assessments, The World Bank - Institutional Assessment Report" only asses the World Bank. By looking at it's evaluations the following strengths and weaknesses of the institution is found." (MOPAN, 2017) IFC is have the following advantages; The projects of the finance channel have a high relevance; "It has a global reach, a wider range of products and services than the UK can offer, and extensive sectoral expertise (e.g. financial markets, infrastructure)" (DFID, 2016). IFC's focus on sustainability of the projects have increased; "For the IFC, the share of investment projects with potential environmental benefits from financed activities increased from 31 percent to 35 percent."(IEG, 2018) Furthermore; "IFC has introduced a comprehensive results management framework" (DFID, 2016). Aside from this, IFC's is also facing some challenges; the efficiency of IFC's projects have declined; "Ratings for outcome achievement, strategic relevance, and efficiency indicators of development effectiveness have declined." (IEG, 2018) Furthermore; "The IFC is the largest global development finance institution focused on the private sector, and one of the most effective" (DFID, 2016). But following IEG, there have been a decline in the effectiveness of IFC; "IFC management notes the continuing decline in the investment development outcome rating to 50 percent on an unweighted basis and a sharp year-on-year decline in IFC Advisory Services' development effectiveness rating to 49 percent on an unweighted basis." (IEG, 2018)
Team observation/comments (including from questionnaire)	

OECD criteria's and other questions

	Description (from documents)
a. Relevance The extent to which the climate finance projects are suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient countries and donor.	"It has a global reach, a wider range of products and services than the UK can offer, and extensive sectoral expertise (e.g. financial markets, infrastructure)" (DFID, 2016).

b. Impact Contribution to transformational change at societal level. - Contribution to limiting global warming to 1,5 degrees and or contribution (quantity and quality) to climate adaptation in vulnerable communities.	"It plays an important role in delivering UK and international objectives by combining its investment and advisory businesses" (DFID, 2016).
c. Effectiveness - In general, how effective the design and implementation of the projects/programmes are. - the extent to which intended and actual activities are suited to the priorities and policies of beneficiary countries and to the needs of local communities.	"IFC management notes the continuing decline in the investment development outcome rating to 50 percent on an unweighted basis and a sharp year-on-year decline in IFC Advisory Services' development effectiveness rating to 49 percent on an unweighted basis. IFC management takes this seriously and has factored it into many of the organizational and procedural changes it has made over the past year and planned for the near future." (IEG, 2018) "FC has begun implementing initiatives to address the declining development outcome in investment projects, but discussions with IEG on the root causes of development effectiveness and work quality for advisory services are ongoing. Implementation results will become evident only with the evaluation of projects approved in FY18 and onward." (IEG, 2018)
d. Efficiency - Qualitative and quantitative outputs of the portfolio in relation to the inputs provided. - In the case of mitigation projects: reduction of emissions relative to funds disbursed/available. - Administration costs relative to funds disbursed and outputs.	"Ratings for outcome achievement, strategic relevance, and efficiency indicators of development effectiveness have declined. In FY14–16, advisory projects in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean had the lowest share of positive development effectiveness ratings by number of projects and volume, respectively" (IEG, 2018)
e. Sustainability Long-term social, economic and environmental sustainability of interventions (such as the degree to which the	"The World Bank Group increased its support for environmental sustainability in projects across the four institutions from FY08–10 to FY15–17 (based on large samples): (…). For the IFC, the share of investment projects with potential environmental benefits from financed activities increased from 31 percent to 35 percent."(IEG, 2018)

supported interventions will have a lasting effect after their termination)	
f. Environmental and social **safeguards** (including human rights, gender, minorities)	"IFC operations contribute to several SDGs. Integral to IFC's mandate and aligned with the WBG's twin goals are SDGs 1 and 10: 'No Poverty' and 'Reduced Inequality.' (IFC, 2018). "At the strategic sector level, IFC promotes investment and advisory projects in infrastructure, agriculture, financial inclusion, health and education—aligned with SDGs 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9" (IFC, 2018).
g. Alignment and ownership To what extent the organization / projects safeguard / connect to national plans; especially climate and natural diversity plans (NAMA, NAPA, NDC, biodiversity NBSAP) and also energy plans.	
h. Learning Assess the organizations' ability to learn; follow-up of evaluation reports and project reviews.	"Since the last MAR [2013], IFC has introduced a comprehensive results management framework" (DFID, 2016). "While progress has been made in environmental and social risk management, monitoring implementation of performance standards could be strengthened." (DFID, 2016).

Key information and conclusion

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established in 1956 and is a member of the World Bank Group.

Purpose: IFC works with the private sector in developing countries to create markets that open up opportunities for all.

IFC has 184 member countries, each holding a share of capital. The main shareholders are USA 22%, UK 5%, France 5% and Germany 5%. Norway has 0.69 % of the shares% ? (IFC, 2019c). Member countries govern the World Bank Group through the Boards of Governors and the Boards of Executive Directors.

As the largest development finance institution supporting the private sector in emerging markets, IFC is uniquely positioned to create and grow new markets for climate business. Backed by a World Bank Group commitment to mobilize $13 billion in private sector capital by 2020, IFC is mainstreaming climate business in high-growth sectors, thus opening new markets in key areas such as clean energy, green finance, green buildings, climate-smart cities, and climate-smart agribusiness.

The annual climate finance commitments totalled USD 2,964 million in 2017 (see table in Chapter 4). This will increase considerably in view of the World Bank Group's announcement at COP24 to double the current level before 2025.

According to the DFID report, IFC needs to improve its transparency. Much more information can be found in the DFID report "MDR Assessment of International Finance Corporation" from 2016 and the IEG report "Results and Performance of the World Bank Group 2017" from 2018.

Obviously, Norfund follows the IFC's work closely, as it has a similar mandate and carries out similar investments with the private sector.

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